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In Chapter 3, it was argued that accountability arrangements should depend 
on organisational function. In Chapter 4, it was shown that depending on 
their main function, four different groups of partnerships can be distin-
guished. Which kind of accountability should each of these groups concen-
trate on? And which standards do partnerships need to live up to in order to 
create a sufficient level of accountability?
This chapter takes each functional group of partnerships in turn and 
establishes which accountability standards it, as well as other organisations 
with similar functions, should fulfil.
5.1 Advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships: Basic 
standards for all partnerships
The first group of partnerships identified above includes those whose main 
purpose is to promote certain issues through advocacy and awareness 
campaigns. Often, these partnerships also collect and disseminate relevant 
information and offer a platform for the coordination of the activities and 
programmes of members.
As indicated above, these partnerships only require basic forms of author-
ity to operate. They are basic in the sense that they are a precondition for any 
partnership to work. Partnerships exercising functions other than advocacy 
and awareness raising demand other forms of authority in addition to this 
basic set. All partnerships should therefore comply with the accountability 
standards developed here for advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships, 
in addition to their more specific requirements. The common basis for all 
partnership types includes three forms of delegated or assumed authority.
Firstly, partnerships need the authority to exist and operate. Who grants 
this authority depends on the formal constitution of the partnership. 
Partnerships can be incorporated and have independent legal status. In this 
case, the country of incorporation determines the rules and conditions for 
registration. Most countries have stricter rules for organisations that are 
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granted exemptions from taxes.1 Partnerships that are not incorporated as 
independent entities derive their authority to operate from their founding 
members and the institution(s) hosting the partnership secretariat. Thus 
the host organisation, often in cooperation with the founding partners, can 
determine which rules and procedures apply to the partnership.
Secondly, partnerships need to acquire authority over the necessary opera-
tional resources. For their financial needs they can rely on a variety of sources. 
Some draw on an initial endowment to support their ongoing activities, oth-
ers use contributions from members, individual or institutional donations 
or, in rare exceptions, revenues from commercial engagements. In addition, 
partnerships often rely on volunteer staff time, as well as office space and 
equipment contributed by partner organisations.
Thirdly, partnerships require the support of partner organisations or 
members. Even where they do not contribute financial or other resources, 
partners are important because they express support for the partnership and 
its mission through their membership. This kind of support is especially 
important for advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships. Their members 
usually have to explicitly endorse the partnership’s goals by signing up to its 
mission statement. The more individuals and organisations do so, the more 
forcefully an advocacy and awareness-raising partnership can promote its 
cause. Supportive partner or member organisations are also more likely to 
contribute relevant information to the partnership, to take up knowledge 
and information disseminated by the partnership and to accept the partner-
ship’s proposals for coordinating member activities.
As depicted in Figure 5.1, the basic forms of authority required by 
 partnerships – the licence to operate, authority over operational resources 
and support by partner organisations – give rise to three basic forms of 
accountability. All types of partnerships should at a minimum be subject to 
procedures and mechanisms to ensure accountability for complying with 
relevant rules and regulations, to create financial accountability and to gen-
erate accountability for working towards the partnership’s mission.
Many NGOs are functionally similar to advocacy and awareness-raising 
partnerships. While NGOs do engage in many different kinds of activities,2 
advocacy and awareness raising as well as the collection and dissemination 
of information and the provision of platforms for coordination are often 
core components of NGO work.3 While developing concrete accountability 
standards for advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships, we can therefore 
draw on broadly accepted and established governance and accountability 
standards for NGOs.
5.1.1 Accountability for complying with relevant rules 
and regulations
Rules are designed to regulate behaviour. They serve to prevent individuals and 
organisations from abusing their authority and violating the rights of others. 
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Because societies, host institutions and partner organisations grant them the 
right to operate, partnerships have a duty to ensure they comply with the rel-
evant rules and regulations. These rules are defined by various kinds of institu-
tions and are often linked to different accountability mechanisms.
Firstly, partnerships exercise their activities in specific countries. Wherever 
they operate, local civil and criminal laws apply. Compliance with civil and 
criminal legislation is enforced by local court systems. Their efficiency in 
creating accountability for compliance with laws varies between countries. 
In well-governed societies with an established tradition of the rule of law, 
compliance tends to be relatively widespread, even though individual vio-
lations can go undetected or remain unpunished. In countries with weak 
legal systems and rampant corruption, by contrast, illegal behaviour may be 
common and legal accountability often remains low.
Secondly, many partnerships choose to incorporate or register themselves 
as independent legal entities. Incorporation and registration usually take 
place in individual countries and are linked to specific rules and regulations 
for the chosen form of organisation. It is most common for partnerships 
to seek registration as tax-exempt organisations or charities. Among the 
partnerships presented earlier, for example, GRI is incorporated as a Dutch 
foundation, ICANN is a non-profit, public benefit corporation in California, 
GAIN is a Swiss foundation, GVEP International is recognised as a charity in 
the UK, REEEP is an international NGO in Austria, the 4C initiative a Swiss 














































Figure 5.1 Accountability of advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships
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as a charity in the UK and with non-profit status in the US. While the exact 
stipulations vary from country to country, partnerships have to fulfil specific 
criteria to be recognised as a charity or tax-exempt organisation. This usually 
includes the requirement to promote an accepted public good, to adopt cer-
tain standards relating to the governance of the organisation and to submit 
regular reports on activities and finances.4
The authority to register organisations and to recognise them as charita-
ble or tax-exempt can be vested in different institutions. In some countries, 
the tax authorities are responsible, in others it is a branch of the judiciary, 
a government ministry or an independent commission. Irrespective of their 
institutional identity, these authorities can hold partnerships accountable for 
complying with the rules linked to registration. Thus if they are not satisfied 
with the institutional design and purpose of the organisation at the outset, 
they have the authority to deny registration or recognition.5 Moreover, these 
institutions usually demand regular and standardised reports on the part-
nership’s financial situation and activities. If the partnership fails to comply 
with this stipulation or if its reports reveal an infraction of other rules, the 
organisation’s charitable status can be revoked. Some charity commissions 
or registration offices can, in addition, supervise or audit registered organisa-
tions in greater detail. If properly applied, these options allow registration 
offices significant control over partnerships.
Thirdly, partnerships that are not registered as independent legal entities 
are usually hosted by other organisations. In most cases, one or several of the 
core partner organisations assume this role. EITI, for example, is hosted by the 
Norwegian Government, Stop TB and RBM by WHO and GAVI by UNICEF. It 
also occurs, though it seems to be less common, that external organisations 
are entrusted with this task. The Voluntary Principles, for instance, have a 
secretariat hosted jointly by the International Business Leaders Forum and 
Business for Social Responsibility. The host organisations, especially if they 
are large and established, have detailed rules governing their operations. 
Intergovernmental organisations such as UNICEF or WHO are usually free to 
determine what these rules are. Others, like the International Business Leaders 
Forum, are themselves registered as charities and must therefore comply with 
the applicable national rules. However the rules may be defined, a partnership 
that is hosted by a third organisation thereby becomes subject to its internal 
rules and regulations.
The mechanisms available for enforcing the internal rules of host organi-
sations vary widely. As ultima ratio, host organisations can terminate their 
cooperation with the partnership. In addition, more established organisations 
often have internal disciplinary measures to enforce compliance with their 
rules. These can include complaints procedures, as well as internal evalua-
tions, audits and disciplinary sanctions. The WHO, for example, has a system 
of internal controls under the auspices of its director general that includes 
the review, evaluation and monitoring of all its operations and activities.6 
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The institutional set-up of the host organisation is thus an important deter-
minant for the effectiveness of its rules as an accountability mechanism for 
partnerships. Another important factor is whether the partnership is hosted 
by one or several institutions. With more than one host organisation, respon-
sibilities are split and more difficult to assign and it is potentially unclear 
which rules apply in which situation.
Finally, internal rules and processes can support and complement these 
external and externally enforced rules. Partner organisations usually deter-
mine internal rules in the mutual agreement setting up a partnership, in 
the partnership’s statutes or by-laws, in the terms of reference for individual 
partnership bodies or in a code of conduct for partnership staff. These docu-
ments usually define the partnership’s mission, goals, targets and values; the 
composition, function and responsibilities of the various partnership bodies; 
work processes for taking decisions, accounting, reporting and auditing; as 
well as rules governing conflicts of interest or other standards for the behav-
iour of staff members. The by-laws of the Global Fund, for instance, specify 
the partnership’s mission and goals, as well as the purpose, composition, 
function, responsibilities and working methods for each partnership body. In 
addition, the partnership has adopted an ethics and conflict of interest policy 
that, for example, defines standards of conduct for contacts with members of 
the Global Fund involved in funding decisions.7
Partnerships can take various steps to make internal rules effective as 
accountability mechanisms. Firstly, the rules, processes and responsibilities 
need to be explicit, clear and known to those concerned. This implies that 
internal rules and regulations should be available in written form, should 
cover the most important aspects of the organisation’s work and should be 
communicated adequately to all staff members and partners.
Broadly recognised governance requirements for NGOs also emphasise this 
point. Thus, for example, the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law iden-
tifies as a generally accepted international practice that national laws require 
non-profits to submit their governance arrangements with registration and 
may require rules on conflicts of interest.8 The Panel on Accountability and 
Governance in the Voluntary Sector proposes that boards adopt ‘a code of 
ethical conduct and an effective monitoring and complaints procedure’ as 
well as ‘a framework for internal regulations, including a constitution and 
bylaws’ (Panel on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary Sector, 
1999, p. 29). Similarly, the International Non Governmental Organisations’ 
Accountability Charter stresses that organisations should have ‘written pro-
cedures covering the appointment, responsibilities and terms of members 
of the governing body, and preventing and managing conflicts of interest’ 
(International Non Governmental Organisations, 2006, p. 4). The Handbook 
on NGO Governance goes into greater detail and suggests that the basic 
documents of an NGO should include the name of governing body(ies), their 
relation to other organisational entities, the basic responsibilities and powers 
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of different bodies, the duties of individual board members, the minimum 
number of board members, membership rules, terms of office, number of 
meetings per year, the method of convening meetings, decision-making pro-
cedures and conflict of interest provisions.9
Secondly, partnerships need effective oversight to ensure compliance with 
internal rules. The main responsibility for exercising oversight lies with a 
formal board or a group of partner organisations exercising board func-
tions. What enables boards or their functional equivalents to fulfil this task 
 effectively? There is a broad literature addressing this question relating to 
non-profit organisations, which often draws on the more established lit-
erature on corporate governance. Researchers reviewing this literature have 
found it diverse and conclude that ‘there is no consensus about an ideal way 
of governing nonprofit organizations’ (Bradshaw et al., 1998, p. 11).
Despite this lack of consensus, most recommendations and codes cover a 
limited range of recurring themes.10 They usually contain measures intended 
to ensure that board members know their responsibilities and the processes 
used to exercise oversight. This includes, for example, recommendations that 
board responsibilities should be clearly defined, standard practices should be 
described in board manuals and new board members should get an orienta-
tion or training. Another group of suggestions aims at creating the precondi-
tions for board members to exercise effective oversight by focusing on their 
skills and the information available to them. This comprises proposals to 
select board members with an adequate mix of skills, to ensure they work 
actively to acquire information about the organisation’s activities and that 
they receive adequate activity and financial reports. A final set of propositions 
is concerned with the willingness of board members to fulfil their duties. This 
includes, for example, recommendations to make attendance of board meet-
ings mandatory, to ensure the independence of board members and to create 
regulations governing conflicts of interest.
Finally, partnership oversight bodies need to be in a position to apply sanc-
tions or incentives to enforce compliance with internal rules. Partnership boards 
or their functional equivalents can often rely on the following sanctions: Most 
boards have the authority to accept and control financial and activity reports 
and to approve future work plans and budgets for the partnership. This means 
that they can require additional or changed reports and they can veto activi-
ties that seem to run counter to internal rules or the partnership’s mission. 
Partnership boards also often hold the authority to appoint and dismiss the 
partnership’s CEO or manager. Thus they can react to suspected misconduct 
by firing the responsible manager. Finally, core partner organisations, which 
are often represented on the board, can sanction insufficient compliance 
with internal rules by withdrawing their support from the partnership.11
The first pillar of accountability for partnerships is compliance with rel-
evant rules and regulations. Partnerships have little influence over many 
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important factors shaping the effectiveness of external rules and their 
enforcement systems. They have little bearing, for example, on the qual-
ity of national regulatory systems and the reliability of courts in host and 
operating countries. Likewise, partnerships can rarely influence the quality 
of governance arrangements of host organisations. But, as the preceding 
discussion has shown, partnerships can take a range of steps to increase their 
accountability for complying with relevant external and internal rules and 
regulations. These measures are the concrete accountability standards that all 
partnerships, including advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships, should 
comply with. They include the following elements.
5.1.1.1 Choose a well-governed host organisation
Partnerships usually determine where they want to operate based on their 
mission and goals, rather than accountability considerations. But they have 
greater flexibility in choosing their host organisation. For this decision, 
issues relating to accountability should be strongly considered.
If a partnership incorporates itself as an independent legal entity, for 
example, it should seek incorporation in a country that has well-defined 
legal and fiscal rules for private organisations. The host country should also 
have a well-established and well-functioning legal system and low levels of 
corruption. Among the case examples, all independently incorporated part-
nerships heed this advice. They are incorporated in the Netherlands, the US, 
Switzerland, the UK, Austria or Sweden.
Instead of incorporation, partnerships can also opt for a secretariat or coor-
dinating mechanism hosted by a third organisation. Arrangements like this 
can create equally strong accountability for complying with relevant rules 
and regulations if a few principles are respected when choosing the host 
organisation. Firstly, partnerships should decide on one host organisation, 
rather than two or more. Where more than one organisation act as hosts, it 
becomes more difficult to assign responsibilities and determine whose rules 
apply under which circumstances. Secondly, the organisation chosen as host 
should itself be incorporated in a well-governed country and/or have a well-
established and well-functioning internal governance system. Most of the 
partnerships contained in the case examples are hosted by intergovernmen-
tal organisations such as UNEP, WHO or UNICEF.
Partnerships can also be managed by largely informal coordination teams, 
usually made up of founding partner organisations. The Handwashing with 
Soap partnership, for instance, is organised by a coordination team from the 
World Bank and the Water and Sanitation Program, as well as through work-
ing groups involving various partner organisations. Arrangements like these 
diffuse accountability for complying with relevant rules. With various inter-
national partners cooperating, it is neither clear which national laws apply to 
the activities of the partnership, nor can a clear host institution be identified. 
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Instead of informal coordination teams, partnerships should therefore either 
incorporate or choose an organisation to host their secretariat.
5.1.1.2 Adopt clear internal rules
In addition to external rules and regulations defined by host countries or 
organisations, the founding members of a partnership can define internal 
rules and processes. Internal regulations are important to ensure that the 
partnership operates in the way and for the goals intended by the founding 
partners. Internal rules can also be an additional means for ensuring compli-
ance with external norms.
To establish an effective set of internal rules, partnerships should conform 
to the following principles:
Partnerships should state their internal rules, processes and governance 
arrangements clearly and in writing.
Internal rules should cover the central elements of the partnership’s gov-
ernance, including all of the partnership’s bodies, committees or working 
groups, detailing their authorities, roles and responsibilities; the processes 
for taking decisions and reporting on activities and finances; and the ethi-
cal standards and values guiding the partnership’s work.
Partnerships should also take measures to ensure that all those concerned, 
especially members of the oversight body, know the rules and their 
responsibilities. Basic steps to achieve this include making the rules and 
procedures easily available and providing new staff and board members 
with an introduction or training on the rules.
5.1.1.3 Create an effective oversight body with the ability to apply sanctions
In a final important step to create accountability for complying with relevant 
rules and regulations, partnerships should create an effective internal over-
sight body. This board or committee monitors whether or not the partnership 
and its staff comply with relevant rules. Its role is important because it creates 
awareness about the rules, can have a preventive effect and can uncover and 
rectify cases of non-compliance or abuse.
Partnerships can take a number of steps to establish an effective internal 
oversight mechanism:
Partnerships must clearly assign the responsibility to exercise oversight to 
one of their bodies or committees, such as the partnership board. When 
defining these institutional arrangements, partnerships should make sure 
that the oversight function is clearly separated from management respon-
sibilities. This increases the likelihood that the oversight body will act as 
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Partnerships should ensure that members of the oversight body clearly 
understand their responsibilities. Next to choosing committed individu-
als to serve on the oversight body, partnerships can support this by high-
lighting oversight duties during the recruitment process and providing 
members with written or oral instructions and good practice examples on 
implementation.
Partnerships should also make sure that members of the oversight body 
are in a position to exercise their responsibilities properly. This requires on 
the one hand that board members have the necessary skills and expertise. 
Important skills include expert knowledge relating to the thematic focus 
of the partnership, a good understanding of the legal and regulatory envi-
ronment for the partnership’s work and experience in accounting, report-
ing and evaluation practices. Individual members do not have to cover 
all of these areas of expertise, but the oversight body as a whole should. 
On the other hand, this entails that other partnership bodies supply the 
oversight body with relevant, timely and accurate information. Oversight 
bodies should have the formal authority to receive and approve annual 
financial and activity reports and get regular updates from partnership 
management. Staff members reporting instances of malpractice can be 
another important source of information. Policies offering protection to 
so-called whistleblowers can further encourage a good information flow to 
the oversight body.
Effective oversight also depends on the willingness of board members to 
exercise their responsibilities adequately. Ultimately, their willingness to 
act lies in the hands of individual board members, but partnerships can 
take some measures to support them. The first crucial step is to select 
individuals suited for this task to serve as members of the oversight body. 
Board members should have high personal integrity and be committed 
to their role. Members of the oversight body should also be independent, 
that is, they should not be closely related to management, and the board 
as a whole should either be neutral or represent the interests of all major 
stakeholders. Partnerships should also define a policy on conflicts of inter-
est and implement it for their board members.
Finally, partnerships should give their oversight bodies the authority to 
apply sanctions. With the means to enforce their conclusions, oversight 
bodies are both more likely to take their own task seriously and to be taken 
seriously by other members and bodies of the partnership. The authority 
and responsibility for accepting annual activity and financial reports is 
key in this regard. It ensures that the partnership provides members of 
the oversight body with relevant information and allows the oversight 
body to demand additional information. This right should be coupled 
with the authority to sanction management. One possible instrument is 
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the oversight body with significant clout, it can also blur the boundaries 
between  management and oversight and undermine the independence 
of the oversight body. Another, less problematic, possibility is to give 
the oversight body the authority to hire (potentially subject to a veto of 
the host organisation) and fire partnership managers.
5.1.2 Financial accountability
Institutions or individuals delegate the authority to manage and allocate 
resources to partnerships. Partnerships, in turn, delegate this authority to 
their managers and responsible staff members. These instances of delegation 
give rise to a legitimate demand for financial accountability. Since all part-
nerships need resources to be able to operate, basic financial accountability 
is expected of all of them.
In practice, accountability for finances involves various levels. Those who 
provide the partnership with resources have the most obvious claim for 
financial accountability. Most partnerships rely predominantly on contribu-
tions from partners or external donors. Some, like ICANN also demand fees 
for the services they provide. Advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships, 
however, do not usually offer goods or services. The following paragraphs 
therefore only consider the role of donors – be they partner organisations or 
external donors – as providers of funds.
Donors have various possibilities for ensuring that their funds are used 
in the way they intended. Most commonly, the contributions of large 
donors are linked to specific reporting requirements. They determine when 
partnerships need to report on their activities and financial decisions. This 
can range from quarterly or annual to project-related reports. In addition, 
donors often prescribe the format to be used for reporting. For partnerships 
depending on various donors all working with different formats, this can 
create a significant workload and costs.
Donors can also tie their contributions to specific activities or areas. MSC, 
for example, reports that of the total donations of £2,283,894 it received in 
2006, £740,148 were restricted in their use (Marine Stewardship Council, 
2006, p. 21). Similarly, REEEP received €876,533 in general donations in the 
financial year 2005–6, and €5,177,228 in donations related to specific projects 
(Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, 2006, p. 39). Tied con-
tributions allow donors to influence relatively directly how their money is 
spent. At the same time, however, they restrict the flexibility of the recipient 
organisation and can thus undermine its ability to react to unforeseen circum-
stances and allocate resources in the most efficient way.12
While most of the partnerships surveyed here rely mainly on large insti-
tutional donors, some also seek contributions from individuals. Thus, for 
example, the Stop TB partnership, the Global Fund and MSC all solicit indi-
vidual donations. Small-scale individual donors cannot negotiate the same 
conditions to their contributions as large donors. Like them, however, they 
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can refuse to donate or discontinue their support. To strengthen the trust of 
individual donors, these partnerships are therefore likely to create transpar-
ency relating to their use of resources. Sometimes, they even allow individual 
donors to select particular activities they want to invest in.
Another possible donor model that partnerships could rely on is that of 
a foundation or trust. In this model, donors provide the partnership with 
a large initial endowment which finances ongoing operations. While none 
of the case examples analysed here can draw on such an endowment, this 
would have important implications for the partnership’s financial account-
ability. The main difference to other donor-based financial models is that 
donors provide all funds upfront. This means that they cannot use the threat 
to discontinue funding as a sanction. Even more than agreements with large 
regular donors, the terms connected to an endowment are likely to define 
very specifically what activities can be supported with the funds and which 
procedures the partnership needs to comply with when taking decisions.
On a second level, partnerships are held accountable for finances by their 
host states or other host organisations. Two different rationales can be at 
work here. In one set of cases, the host organisation also plays the role of a 
donor. This is the case, for example, when states recognise partnerships as 
charities or tax-exempt institutions. As discussed above, this status usually 
restricts the range of permissible activities and is linked to special reporting 
requirements.
In another set of cases, host organisations do not act as donors. Instead, 
they use their authority to grant partnerships the ‘licence to operate’ and 
include rules on financial accounting and reporting as part of their overall 
rules and regulations. The Global Partnership to Stop TB, for example, is 
hosted by WHO. As part of its role as a host, WHO is responsible for finan-
cial administration. While the coordinating board takes decisions with 
financial implications, WHO can veto those on administrative grounds.
On a third level, partnerships further delegate the authority over resources 
internally. Thus, in a typical set-up such as the one chosen by GAIN, donors 
provide the partnership with resources. Internally, the partnership board 
bears fiduciary responsibility. It approves the partnership’s annual work plan 
and budget, receives and approves activity and financial reports and appoints 
the executive director of the secretariat. The executive director appoints 
further staff members and delegates operational authority to allocate and 
account for financial resources to them. Internal rules and procedures on the 
handling, accounting and reporting of finances, linked to internal oversight 
mechanisms, can help to ensure that financial accountability is created at 
this level as well.
Financial accountability, then, is created at various levels. As with 
accountability for complying with relevant rules and regulations, partner-
ships cannot freely determine all relevant parameters at all of these levels. 
In order to ensure an adequate level of financial accountability, advocacy 
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and awareness-raising partnerships, as well as partnerships fulfilling other 
functions, should adopt the following basic accountability standards relat-
ing to finances.
5.1.2.1 Adopt a system of internal financial controls
Internal controls are the first step towards establishing financial account-
ability. They include policies and processes designed to manage the risk of 
fraud and misappropriation. They serve to ensure that resources are used as 
intended and that they are accounted for properly.
A standard set of basic internal control measures are generally accepted as 
good practice for any kind of organisation handling resources. For NGOs, 
these basic standards have been articulated, for example, by the Charity 
Commission for England and Wales, by Mango, a non-profit organisation 
working to improve the financial management of NGOs, and by the Office 
of New York’s Attorney General.13 The recommendations issued by these as 
well as other institutions contain broadly similar components and are subject 
to little controversy.
Advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships, as well as other types of 
partnerships, should adopt the key elements of these standards. They include 
the following measures:
Partnerships should have a clear internal delegation of responsibilities 
relating to resources. Ideally in a written format, the authorities to receive 
payments, authorise expenditures, maintain accounts, oversee accounting 
processes and prepare and approve budgets should be clearly assigned to 
individual staff or board members. It is also important to ensure that the 
assigned individuals have the necessary skills and qualifications to exer-
cise their respective responsibilities.
When assigning the various responsibilities, partnerships should ensure 
that key duties are separated and a system of checks and balances is estab-
lished. Thus, for example, a single individual should not be responsible 
at the same time for processing complete transactions and recording 
them. Similarly, accounts should not be controlled by the person respon-
sible for recording transactions in the first place. Moreover, significant 
expenditures should require the approval and signatures of more than 
one individual.
To enable oversight and control over their activities, partnerships should 
operate on the basis of budgets and financial plans. Regular reconcilia-
tions between the planned budget and actual incomes and expenditures 
as well as reconciliations between partnership records and actual cash, 
property and bank deposits should be carried out.
Finally, partnerships should adopt controls for cash and other assets. Cash 
and valuables should, for example, be kept in a safe place to which gen-
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 individual reference numbers for objects. Receipts should be issued for 
money received and expenditures should be supported by documentation. 
In addition, partnerships should reduce cash transactions to a minimum 
and adopt policies to safeguard investments and fixed assets.
5.1.2.2 Adopt accounting and reporting policies complying with donor demands 
and generating reliable, relevant, comparable and understandable information
Adequate accounting and reporting policies are a further element of a system 
of internal financial controls. They are the cornerstones of financial account-
ability to internal as well as external principals.
A partnership’s accounting system tracks incomes, expenditures and 
changes in assets. It enables those responsible to uncover instances of fraud 
and misappropriation. Reports are based on the data generated by the 
accounting system. They collect and present relevant information in a sys-
tematic manner. They usually cover not only the organisation’s finances but 
also its activities and achievements. Reports thus serve to assess the financial 
situation of a partnership. They allow analysing whether spending decisions 
and activities conform to the partnership’s policies and relevant external 
rules. Importantly, they also help establish what the partnership has achieved 
and how efficiently it works.
Which criteria, though, do accounting and reporting policies need to com-
ply with to create a true and fair view of an organisation? There is a general 
consensus that the generated information must be relevant, reliable, compa-
rable and understandable. These criteria were defined by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB).14 The IASB is an independent, private 
organisation based in London, leading efforts to create internationally 
recognised accounting and reporting standards. It issues the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). These standards are not automatically 
binding but are adopted by an increasing number of countries. Thus, for 
example, the European Union endorses many IFRSs and incorporates them 
into European law.
The standards defined by IASB mainly apply to corporations and there 
is no equivalent body setting standards for NGOs that could be applied to 
advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships.15 In the absence of interna-
tional standards specifically designed for NGOs, many see the UK Charity 
Commission’s Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP) on Accounting 
and Reporting for Charities as an important reference document. The state-
ment reflects the same general principles of relevance, reliability, compara-
bility and understandability (Charity Commission for England and Wales, 
2005, p. 10).
These general principles are relatively abstract. How can they be translated 
into practice? Answering this question requires consideration for a broad 
array of specific and often complex issues. Without going into too much 
detail, the following paragraphs discuss which specific standards are emerging 
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for the accounting practices of non-profit organisations. They then discuss 
requirements for reports to internal governing bodies, donors and public 
authorities.
Relevant and broadly accepted criteria for the accounting practices of non-
profit organisations, which can be applied to advocacy and awareness-raising 
partnerships, have been defined in several documents. Firstly, as already men-
tioned, the UK Charity Commission’s SORP on Accounting and Reporting for 
Charities is a widely used reference document. It often refers to principles laid 
down by the UK Financial Reporting Council and its Accounting Standards 
Board. This body defines Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAPs) 
and Financial Reporting Standards (FRSs), most of which also apply to NGOs 
or charities.16 Secondly, due to the large number of non-profit organisations 
registered in or financed by the US, the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Practices (GAAP) in force there also enjoys wide recognition. The main insti-
tution defining GAAP for charities in the US is the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB). Its statements 93, 116, 117, 124 and 136 set down 
important accounting practices.17
These documents contain an emerging consensus on accounting rules 
that are specific to non-profit organisations and go beyond or deviate from 
generic good accounting practices:
Non-profit organisations should distinguish their incomes and assets 
depending on whether or not their use has been restricted by donors. They 
should also include certain in-kind contributions of services as incomes.18
Non-profits should account separately for expenses related to their mis-
sion or function and those amounting to overhead costs.19
Non-profit organisations should also, like companies, report the gains and 
losses made on assets and investments. In doing so, they should report 
assets and investments at their fair value and take account of depreciation.20
Detailed and broadly accepted accounting standards, then, have been 
defined for charitable organisations and NGOs. Since advocacy and aware-
ness-raising partnerships are functionally similar to non-profit organisa-
tions, they should comply with these accounting standards.
Based on the information generated through the accounting system, part-
nerships should also prepare regular financial and activity reports. The author-
ity over financial resources allowing a partnership to cover its operational 
costs is often delegated by various parties. Partnerships should therefore issue 
reports at different levels, including reports to internal supervisory  bodies, 
reports to donors and reports to host organisations or fiscal authorities. To 
date, only few broadly accepted standards for those reports have emerged. 
The issue is further complicated by the fact that requirements differ depend-
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Firstly, partnerships should prepare internal reports for their governing 
bodies, such as partnership boards or meetings of core partners. As already 
discussed, it is broadly accepted as a standard of good governance for non-
profit organisations that boards or their functional equivalents bear fiduciary 
responsibility. Boards usually take strategic decisions but delegate the task of 
managing and allocating resources to the organisations’ management and 
staff. They exercise control by approving work-plans and budgets and by 
receiving regular reports. There are no commonly accepted standards defin-
ing criteria for these internal reports. Beyond the basic requisite that reports 
should be accurate and understandable, however, the purpose of board 
reports dictates some necessary conditions:
Internal reports should be frequent and be made available regularly before 
the supervisory body convenes.
Partnership boards or equivalent bodies exercise control through their 
approval of work-plans and budgets. Internal reports should therefore 
provide the necessary information to allow for an accurate comparison 
between those documents and the partnership’s actual activities, incomes 
and expenditures.
Internal reports should also support the supervisory body in its strategic 
planning role. To this aim, they should include information on projected 
future financial developments, the financial implications of key decisions 
and the relative effectiveness and efficiency of individual programmes 
and activities.
Secondly, partnerships should submit regular reports to their donors. The 
partnerships described in the case examples rely mainly on the financial 
and other contributions of donors to cover their operational expenses. The 
reports should enable donors to assess whether the partnership has fulfilled 
potential conditions attached to the contributions. Moreover, they should 
allow donors to establish whether or not the resources were used, and were 
used efficiently, to achieve the intended purposes. Which format these 
reports take and whether commonly accepted standards for their content 
exist depends on the type of donor involved.
States represent one important kind of donor. Governments can  sponsor 
partnerships as well as other organisations directly. In terms of creating 
standard reporting requirements, however, their role as indirect donors or 
supporters is more important. As discussed earlier, many partnerships are 
incorporated as independent legal entities and enjoy the status of tax-exempt 
charities or non-profit organisations. As such, they face special reporting 
requirements defined by state authorities. Because of their widespread appli-
cation, these requirements often turn into more generally used parameters 
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similar information or where the official reports are openly accessible and are 
used as a basis for assessing non-profit organisations.
Due to the large number of charities registered there, the annual reports 
requested by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of the US Department of 
the Treasury are seen as an important model for official reports.21 In the US, 
all registered charities with annual revenues exceeding US$25,000 must file 
a completed IRS form 990 every year.22 On this form, non-profits have to 
report their revenues, expenses (differentiating between programme expenses, 
administrative costs, fund-raising expenses and payments to affiliates) and 
changes in their net assets. Moreover, they have to provide balance sheets, 
details on functional expenses, lists of key current and former staff members, 
directors and trustees and discuss their activities and achievements. Following 
a regulation of 1999, non-profits have to make the three most recent IRS 
 filings available to anyone interested upon request.23 With IRS data publicly 
available, it has become an important source of information for NGO assess-
ments. GuideStar, for example, is an organisation collecting information on 
non-profit organisations and rating their accountability. It relies heavily on 
data derived from IRS form 990.24
The reporting requirements in other important host states for non-profit 
organisations including partnerships tend to be broadly similar. In the UK, 
charities with an annual income exceeding £10,000 must file an annual 
return with the Charity Commission.25 What information charities need to 
include depends on their size. With revenues below £250,000, they need 
to list their total incomes and expenditures, the contact details of trustees 
and a summary of their activities. Above £250,000, charities need to include 
further details on fund-raising, benefits for trustees, properties, relations to 
connected trading companies and instances of misappropriation. If revenues 
exceed £1 million, charities have to include a ‘summary information return’, 
which differentiates income by sources and contains additional information 
on aims, strategy, activities and achievements, as well as programme expen-
ditures, governance and future plans. Through the Charity Commission’s 
website, all filed reports are publicly accessible and they are used by agencies 
like GuideStar UK to evaluate organisations.26
For partnerships incorporated as tax-exempt institutions or charities, then, 
official annual returns are an important element of financial accountability. 
Filing these reports is not optional. To fulfil their reporting duty adequately, 
partnerships should:
Incorporate important reporting parameters into their accounting system 
from the outset. If the official annual return requires, for example, to 
distinguish between different types of incomes and expenditures, only 
an accounting system that mirrors these criteria can deliver the necessary 
information.
•
Concrete Partnership Accountability Standards  115
Complete all required sections of the report and verify the accuracy of 
the data.
Prepare and file reports in a timely manner.
Make copies of the report available to interested parties, preferably by 
posting it on the Internet.
Institutional and individual contributors are another important kind of 
donor. Among the partnerships surveyed for this book, most rely on govern-
ments, multilateral institutions, corporations and foundations as their main 
donors.
Large donors tend to attach conditions, including specific reporting 
requirements, to their contributions. Problems can arise when partnerships 
depend on a range of large donors, each imposing different reporting condi-
tions. To reduce the resulting administrative burden, partnerships can try to 
negotiate with donors to achieve a harmonisation of reporting requirements. 
This could, for example, involve a convergence of standards around the cri-
teria for official annual returns.27
Some partnerships, such as Stop TB for example, also solicit individual con-
tributions. In this case, partnerships need to be more proactive for providing 
adequate reports to donors. Small individual donors may not be powerful 
enough to set their own reporting rules, but they do have a right to receive 
adequate information on how their funds are spent. In addition, they can sanc-
tion organisations violating this right by refusing future support. Partnerships 
should therefore publish regular reports for small donors of their own accord.
The most relevant and broadly accepted existing standards for public 
annual reports of advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships are again 
those contained in the UK Charity Commission’s SORP on Accounting and 
Reporting by Charities.28 According to this document, an annual report 
should contain reference and administrative details for the charity, its trus-
tees and advisors; information on the organisation’s structure, governance 
and management; a statement of its objectives and activities; an analysis of 
its achievements and performance; a financial review; as well as an expla-
nation of future plans (Charity Commission for England and Wales, 2005, 
pp. 7–9). For the summarised financial statements, the commission specifies 
that they should contain information on both financial activities and the 
balance sheet, that they ought to be consistent with statutory accounts and 
that they should not be misleading either through omission or inappropriate 
amalgamation.
Regarding their reports to direct donors, advocacy and awareness-raising 
partnerships should therefore comply with the following principles:






116  Accountability in Public Policy Partnerships
Partnerships relying on or intending to reach small individual donors 
should in addition publish an annual report containing accurate and not 
misleading summary financial information and describing the organisa-
tion’s activities and achievements.
Thirdly and finally, partnerships must report to their host organisations. In 
this case, the demand for financial accountability is not based on financial 
support. Rather, it is part of the general rules and regulations that host organ-
isations can attach to the licence to operate. Partnerships can, for example, 
be incorporated as independent legal entities without receiving indirect state 
support through tax exemption. The local fiscal authorities will nevertheless 
demand detailed annual financial reports to determine the organisation’s 
tax burden and to verify its compliance with other rules. Similarly, partner-
ships hosted by a third organisation usually have to report regularly on their 
activities and finances. Again, the reports serve to establish whether the part-
nership complies with internal rules and regulations. Moreover, the reports 
deliver necessary information to host organisations enabling them to fulfil 
their reporting duties.
To strengthen their financial accountability through adequate reporting 
to host organisations, partnerships should ensure they follow relevant rules 
and regulations as described in section 5.1.1.
5.1.2.3 Conduct independent audits for large partnerships
Financial audits work to control an organisation’s accounting and report-
ing practices.29 They involve internal or external professionals assessing 
the fairness of financial statements and their compliance with GAAP or the 
IFRS. Auditors do not usually verify an organisation’s accounts in all their 
detail. Instead, they most often use a sampling technique to test accounting 
practices.
Independent, external financial audits provide the strongest assurance that 
financial statements are fair. External auditors have to fulfil strict professional 
qualification criteria.30 Commissioning an external audit can therefore incur 
significant costs.31 Regulations determining audit requirements often differ 
depending on the kind of organisation concerned. Thus it is common that 
publicly traded companies are generally required to have independent audits. 
Private companies below a certain financial turnover threshold are usually 
exempt from audit requirements.32 For NGOs and non-profit organisations, 
audit regulations vary strongly even among leading Western countries. Over 
recent years, however, a trend has been emerging to make audits obligatory 
for large NGOs exceeding specified financial thresholds.33
In the UK, for example, charities whose gross income exceeds £500,000 or 
charities with a gross income over £100,000 and assets exceeding £2.8 million 
must commission an independent audit.34 In the US, organisations receiving 
federal or state grants of US$500,000 or more must have an independent 
•
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audit.35 So far, non-profits that do not rely on major government grants are 
not subject to an audit requirement. An important recent panel, though, 
was encouraged by leaders of the US Senate Finance Committee to propose 
reforms to strengthen the governance and accountability of the non-profit 
sector. In its final report, the panel recommends the introduction of external 
audits for non-profit organisations with total annual revenues exceeding 
US$1 million.36
The practice of demanding obligatory audits has not been consistently 
implemented in other countries. Despite this, evaluation agencies focus-
ing on NGOs have adopted the standard. The Standards for Charitable 
Accountability of the BBB Wise Giving Alliance, for example, states that 
organisations with an annual gross income of over US$250,000 should have 
an external audit (BBB Wise Giving Alliance, 2003, §11). Moreover, many 
larger NGOs recognise their obligation to provide audited financial state-
ments. In their Accountability Charter, for example, a range of international 
NGOs commit to attaching audit results to the financial data they present in 
annual reports (International Non Governmental Organisations, 2006, p. 4).37
Since there is an emerging consensus that non-profit organisations with 
substantial revenues should undergo independent audits, the same standard 
should apply to advocacy and awareness raising as well as other partnerships. 
Defining a financial threshold after which the standard applies is necessar-
ily somewhat arbitrary. For NGOs, the revenue threshold is often between 
€500,000 and 1 million. For private companies, though, audit exceptions can 
apply up to a turnover of €8.8 million. The threshold chosen here presents a 
relatively conservative limit because the consensus on audit requirements is 
still emerging and not yet firmly established. Therefore, and due to the high 
costs of audits, only partnerships with annual budgets exceeding €5 million 
should be subject to independent, external audits to strengthen financial 
accountability.
To be effective, audits have to fulfil certain principles. The most basic 
requirement is that only professional and independent auditors should con-
duct audits. As for accounting, other, more detailed auditing standards have 
been defined by various professional and regulatory bodies. At the interna-
tional level, a crucial rule-setting institution is the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) and its International Auditing and Assurance Standards 
Board (IAASB). It sets the International Standards on Auditing (ISAs). ISA 200, 
for example, defines the ‘objective and general principles governing an audit 
of financial statements’ and applies to audits in all sectors.38 It requires audi-
tors to comply with the IFAC Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants 
(International Federation of Accountants’ Ethics Committee, 2005), to adopt 
an attitude of professional scepticism, to reduce audit risk, to obtain rea-
sonable assurance that financial statements are free from material misstate-
ments and to determine whether the financial reporting framework adopted 
by the organisation under scrutiny is acceptable (International Federation 
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of Accountants, 2007, pp. 213–29).39 Audits on the financial statements of 
partnerships should comply with relevant international and national audit-
ing standards.
In summary, partnerships should observe the following principles relating 
to audits:
Partnerships with annual budgets exceeding €5 million should submit 
their financial statements to professional, independent audits.
The audits should comply with applicable ISAs, as well as relevant addi-
tional national regulations.
Audit results should be published together with the audited financial 
statements.
5.1.3 Accountability for working towards the partnership’s mission
Finally, advocacy and awareness-raising partnerships need the general sup-
port of partners or members to be able to work effectively. ‘General support’ 
is a more diffuse notion than either the granting of a licence to operate or 
the delegation of authority over operational resources. It is therefore also 
less immediately clear which kind of accountability demand follows from 
the granting of support.
The lack of clarity stems from two factors. Firstly, general support can 
manifest itself in different ways depending on the orientation of the partner-
ship. Partnerships like PCFV focus mainly on advocacy campaigns to influ-
ence important decision makers. Support in this case means that partners 
subscribe to this call and grant the partnership the authority to speak on 
their behalf when advancing its claims. Partnerships like REEEP aim to serve 
as information hubs. Here, active support implies that partners supply their 
information to the partnership and use and integrate the information offered 
by the partnership in their work. Advocacy and awareness-raising partner-
ships can also emphasise their role as coordinators, as does, for example, 
RBM. In that case, support entails that partners accept the authority of RBM 
to propose modalities for coordination.
Secondly, partner organisations can have very different motives for joining 
or supporting partnerships. Businesses, for example, are often  interested in 
showing good corporate citizenship, increasing their reputation or improv-
ing their investment markets. Governments and intergovernmental organi-
sations may be driven by a desire to mobilise additional resources, by the 
urge to demonstrate leadership or by the wish to develop more effective 
approaches to problem solving. NGOs, in turn, can in addition be motivated 
by the desire to gain influence over key decisions.40 These different motives 
give rise to different expectations of what partnerships should deliver. 
Partner organisations will therefore hold a partnership to account by either 
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Despite these variations, support is in all cases closely linked to partner-
ship mission. As described above, the partnership’s mission strongly influ-
ences what support entails in practice. Moreover, the partnership’s mission 
usually serves as a common denominator for all partner organisations. 
These organisations are presumably only willing to join a particular partner-
ship with its specific mission if they believe that this meets their expecta-
tions. Both, a company trying to enhance its reputation and a government 
 seeking new ways to address public policy problems, for example, can only 
achieve their objectives if the partnership works successfully towards its own 
goals.
In exchange for the general support of their partners and members, advo-
cacy and awareness-raising partnerships should therefore be accountable for 
working towards achieving their mission. To create this kind of accountabil-
ity, partnerships should follow some basic standards in their work:
5.1.3.1 Define a clear mission
An obvious and necessary precondition for making partnerships accountable 
to their mission is to have a clearly defined and understood mission. Writing 
down a clear and meaningful mission statement is not always an easy task. 
The challenge is to define a goal and vision that is broad and flexible enough 
to integrate various actors with potentially very different interests and to 
allow the partnership to adapt flexibly to changing circumstances. At the 
same time, however, the mission statement should be specific enough to 
have meaning for partners and supporters and to be able to guide strategic 
planning and programming.
The Stop TB partnership provides a good example for the required level of 
specificity of mission statements. The partnership pursues the strategic goal 
of eliminating tuberculosis as a public health problem and achieving a world 
free of TB. In this quest, it defines its mission as follows:
To ensure that every TB patient has access to effective diagnosis, treat-
ment and cure; To stop the transmission of TB; To reduce the inequitable 
social and economic toll of TB; To develop and implement new preven-
tive, diagnostic and therapeutic tools and strategies to stop TB.
(http://www.stoptb.org/stop_tb_initiative/#vmg, 
last accessed 27 August 2009)
To ensure their mission is clear, meaningful and relevant, partnerships 
should adhere to the following principles:41
Partnerships should adopt mission statements that are specific enough 
to provide guidance for their strategic planning and the development of 
programmes and activities.
•
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Mission statements should be published in a prominent position in pub-
lications and reference documents and should be known to the partner-
ships’ key stakeholders.
To increase the mission statement’s practical relevance and ensure that 
it is and continues to be backed by partner organisations, partnerships 
should periodically discuss and review their missions.
5.1.3.2 Orient partnership activities along the mission
Once a partnership has created a clear and meaningful mission statement, 
the next challenge is to ensure its relevance to the partnership’s activities. 
Accountability to mission implies that the mission statement plays a central 
role in the planning and work of a partnership. This can be achieved if the 
following principles are respected:
Partnerships should not conduct any major activities that are unrelated to 
their mission. Instead, all important elements of their work programmes 
should promote their mission.
Mission statements should guide the strategic planning of partnerships. 
Using a results chain or logical framework approach,42 partnerships should 
identify which courses of action are likely to contribute to achieving their 
mission and select them accordingly.
To make the rationale behind their work programmes transparent, part-
nerships should also structure their activity reports around their mission. 
These reports should contain an explanation of how the partnership’s 
main efforts are intended to contribute to the mission. Moreover, activity 
reports should portray the partnership’s achievements, the obstacles it 
encountered and the consequences it drew from past experiences.
5.1.3.3 Employ resources efficiently in pursuit of the mission
Finally, an organisation intent on creating accountability for working 
towards its mission needs to demonstrate that it uses its resources efficiently 
in pursuing its goals. Measuring efficiency in organisations addressing public 
policy problems is notoriously difficult, because they have no clearly defined 
bottom line and address complex issues.43
Most efforts to evaluate the efficiency of public policy programmes rely 
on benchmarks. Benchmarking is a technique originally developed by com-
panies. It involves identifying the best competitor and using that organi-
sation’s performance as a yardstick.44 Benchmarking can be a useful tool 
for assessing the relative efficiency of partnerships or other organisations 
working in the same field. It could be used, for example, to compare the 
efficiency of the Global Fund, RBM and other health providers in fighting 
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efficiency criteria that would be applicable to organisations working in dif-
ferent fields.
The efficiency standards defined here for advocacy and awareness-raising 
partnerships therefore have to remain very general. They include the follow-
ing basic principles and criteria:
Partnerships should define priorities for the allocation of scarce resources 
depending on how efficiently the various possible activities contribute to 
the achievement of the partnership’s mission.45 To create a reliable basis 
for these decisions, partnership boards or management should encourage 
evaluations of ongoing programmes.
Partnerships should control their costs related to administration and 
fund-raising and ensure that the clear majority of their resources is 
spent on programme activities. Following a broadly accepted benchmark 
for NGOs, partnerships should at the very least allocate 65 per cent of 
their total funds to activities designed to directly contribute to mission 
achievement.46
5.1.4 Summary of standards
Table 5.1 contains a summary of relevant accountability standards for advo-
cacy and awareness-raising partnerships.
•
•











Incorporate as an independent legal 
entity in a country with well-defined 
rules for private organisations and a 
well-established and functioning legal 
system
Or choose one organisation to host 
the partnership, which is itself well 
governed
Adopt clear internal 
rules
Clearly define internal rules, processes 
and governance arrangements 
Rules cover roles and responsibilities 
of partnership bodies, decision-making 
procedures, reporting requirements 
and ethical standards
Ensure that internal rules are known 









Create an effective 
oversight body with 
the ability to apply 
sanctions
Clearly assign responsibility for 
oversight to one body or committee 
and separate it from management 
responsibility
Ensure members of the oversight 
body understand their responsibilities 
by choosing committed individuals, 
emphasising responsibilities during 
recruitment and offering 
information
Ensure that members of the oversight 
body have the necessary skills and 
expertise and are adequately supplied 
with information, including through 
whistle-blower protection 
Select independent individuals with 
strong personal integrity to serve on 
the oversight body and adopt a conflict 
of interest policy
Enable members of the oversight body 
to apply sanctions and incentives
Financial 
accountability
Adopt a system of 
internal financial 
controls
Clearly delegate internal 
responsibilities for resources
Separate key duties and install a system 
of checks and balances
Operate on the basis of budgets and 
financial plans








Distinguish incomes and assets 
depending on whether or not their use 
has been restricted by donors
Account separately for expenses 
related to mission/function and 
overhead costs
Report gains and losses made on 
assets and investments, using their 

















Internal reports should be available 
before board meetings, enable a 
comparison between budgets, 
work-plans and actual activities and 
enable strategic planning
Incorporate reporting requirements in 
the accounting system, file complete 
and accurate returns on time and make 
them publicly available on request
Reports to donors should comply 
with the conditions set by large 
donors; partnerships relying on small, 
individual donors should publish 
annual reports including a financial 




audits for large 
partnerships
Partnerships with annual budgets 
exceeding €5 million should undergo 
professional, independent audits
Audits should comply with relevant 
ISAs and national regulations






Define a clear 
mission
Mission statements should be specific 
enough to guide strategic planning and 
programming
Publish mission statements 
prominently and ensure it is 
understood by stakeholders




Do not conduct any major activities 
unrelated to partnership mission
Use mission statements as a guide to 
strategic planning
Structure activity reports around the 
mission
Employ resources 
efficiently in pursuit 
of the mission
Define priorities based on mission-
related efficiency and evaluate 
ongoing programmes
Control overhead costs and ensure 
they do not exceed 35 per cent of total 
revenues
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5.2 Standards for rule setting and regulation partnerships
A second group of partnerships comprises those engaged in defining new 
rules, standards or regulations for specific policy areas or groups of organisa-
tions. GRI, for example, develops standards and guidelines for sustainability 
reporting, ICANN regulates important aspects of the Internet, WCD has 
created criteria for decisions relating to the building of large dams, MSC 
developed rules for sustainable fisheries, EITI has proposed standards on 
transparency in the extractive industries and the Voluntary Principles created 
guidelines for the security arrangements of companies.
In all those cases, compliance with the proposed rules or regulations is ulti-
mately voluntary. The partnerships chosen as case examples here all operate 
at the international level. Thus they work outside the realm of nation states 
and their rule-making and rule-enforcement systems. The proposed norms 
do also not enjoy the status of international law. To be considered as bind-
ing under international law, governments either have to back norms through 
explicit agreement or through consistent customary practice.47 The partner-
ships analysed here, however, usually only include a very limited number of 
governments, their rules have not (yet) become common state practice and 
do often not address states but companies or other organisations.48
Yet the rules and regulations defined by partnerships are not always and 
not necessarily non-binding. Partnerships can, for example, involve private 
actors in the decision-making processes of official norm-setting institutions, 
such as national parliaments or international conventions. The results of 
the work of these partnerships are immediately incorporated into national 
or international law and are therefore binding. In addition, even voluntary 
rules set by partnerships can assume a de facto binding character when the 
affected stakeholders depend strongly on the partnership.
The rules and regulations defined by partnerships are thus very often, but 
not necessarily, non-binding. What does this imply for the authority del-
egated to or assumed by rule-setting partnerships? As discussed in detail in 
section 3.2.3, especially organisations operating at the inter- or transnational 
level often lack prior authorisation. Instead, they rely on ex-post or even 
hypothetical delegation to legitimise their activities. Most of the rule-setting 
partnerships under scrutiny here operate in the hope that as many relevant 
actors as possible will comply voluntarily with the proposed rules and thus 
accept them as binding for themselves. In order to achieve this kind of 
ex-post authorisation, rule-setting partnerships should therefore adopt the 
same accountability arrangements as if they had the authority to determine 
binding rules.
What, then, are the accountability principles linked to the authority to 
set binding rules? Building on respect for the principle of autonomy, the 
authority to determine rules requires democratic accountability. Rule-setting 
partnerships should therefore focus on creating democratic accountability to 
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those delegating the authority to establish rules. This accountability focus, 
in addition to the basic accountability standards defined in the previous 
 section, is depicted in Figure 5.2.
5.2.1 Applying democratic accountability standards to rule-setting 
partnerships
Because of their concentration on developing new rules and regulations for 
certain areas or groups of actors, rule-setting partnerships should espouse 
democratic accountability mechanisms. The traditional field for the applica-
tion of democratic accountability is the public sector. Rule-setting partnerships 
assume functions resembling most closely those of the legislative. Parliaments 
are typically held accountable by a combination of elections, supplementary 
mechanisms to involve citizens, rules and a system of checks and balances.
Partnerships operate in a very different institutional environment than 
traditional legislative bodies. Therefore, the mechanisms used to create leg-
islative accountability should not be applied directly to rule-setting partner-
ships. Rather, legislative accountability mechanisms fulfil various purposes. 
The accountability arrangements that rule-setting partnerships should adopt 
do not necessarily have to take the exact same form, but they must achieve 
the same effects as parliamentary accountability mechanisms.
Legislative accountability pursues two major aims: to give those affected 




















































Figure 5.2 Accountability of rule setting and regulation partnerships
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legislative authority. Individual democratic polities emphasise different ele-
ments, but tend to use a common set of mechanisms to achieve these ends.
To achieve the inclusion of citizens in the legislative process, most demo-
cratic countries rely on regular parliamentary elections, as well as elements 
of direct democracy. Supplementary accountability mechanisms strengthen 
the provision of information to citizens, for example through transparent 
governance processes, the work of the media and the opposition. Another set 
of supplementary tools provides citizens with additional means to articulate 
their interests. They include official consultation processes, opinion polls, 
interpretations of the ‘public mood’ created by the media, as well as interest 
groups, protests, lobby activities, petitions and the use of public complaints 
procedures.
In order to avoid the abuse of legislative authority, democracies typically 
rely on rules and systems of checks and balances. Constitutional rules, for 
instance, safeguard fundamental rights and delimit the authority of parlia-
ments. Procedural rules, moreover, determine the formalities and ensure that 
decisions are taken in a transparent manner. Through checks and balances, 
both the executive and the judiciary have certain possibilities to control leg-
islative actions. This puts them in a position to prevent or counter potential 
abuses of legislative authority.
Fulfilling their responsibility to be democratically accountable, rule-setting 
partnerships should adopt accountability arrangements that are functionally 
equivalent to legislative accountability. In other words, they should adopt 
accountability mechanisms that allow for the effective participation of those 
affected by the rules and that prevent an abuse of the partnership’s authority.
5.2.2 Accountability through participation
Giving those affected an influence over decision-making processes has long 
been accepted as a hallmark of democracy. More recently, the principle has 
also been recognised as important for many organisations working at the 
trans- or international level, especially those focusing on development.49 For 
organisations defining rules, guidelines or standards, two sets of international 
standards exist. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 
which is very influential since its standards are often translated into binding 
rules, has published a guide outlining procedures and participation rules for 
standard-setting bodies.50 Building on this document, but taking the criteria 
much further, the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and 
Labelling Alliance (ISEAL) has produced a code of good practice for organisa-
tions setting social and environmental standards.51
For international organisations and NGOs not involved in setting rules 
and regulations, similar standards for the inclusion of affected stakeholders 
have not been defined. Since the practice enjoys great popularity, however, 
numerous handbooks, ‘how-to’-guides and studies on the effectiveness of 
individual techniques have been published.52
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In the following paragraphs, democratic accountability standards for 
rule-setting partnerships are proposed. They are either derived from general 
democratic principles, the ISO and ISEAL codes or draw on broadly accepted 
practices of participation. The standards cover two main areas: formal ave-
nues for participation and inclusion and the provision and dissemination of 
information.
5.2.2.1 Create formal possibilities for participation and inclusion
The first and most obvious step for giving those affected a say in the delibera-
tions and decisions of rule-setting partnerships is to create formal avenues 
for participation. Partnerships can choose between various options of how 
to include stakeholders. Each model has its own problems and advantages. 
Which alternative is most effective and best suited to the situation depends, 
among other factors, on how many groups or individuals need to be included 
and on how strongly those groups are organised.
As a first alternative, partnerships can include stakeholder representatives 
in their formal governance structures. The WCD, for example, emphasised 
the multi-stakeholder composition of its central decision-making bodies. 
The 12-member commission itself took the most important decisions and 
approved the text of the report, containing standards and principles for 
the building of large dams. The commission was selected by a multi-stake-
holder working group to represent various stakeholder groups, including 
governments, project-affected people, NGOs, people’s movements, the 
dam-construction industry, export credit agencies, private investors and the 
international development community.53 Moreover, the commission relied 
strongly on the WCD Stakeholder Forum as a sounding board and advisory 
group. This forum was made up of 68 members, including the participants of 
the original multi-stakeholder workshop, as well as additional members that 
were granted access to make the forum more inclusive.
Including stakeholders in the decision-making bodies of partnerships 
strangthens their democratic accountability. Through their direct involve-
ment, stakeholder representatives have immediate control over the outcomes 
of the rule-setting process. This model corresponds most closely to the tra-
ditional democratic paradigm, where citizens tend to elect the members of 
 parliament. Instead of citizens, partnerships include stakeholders. In princi-
ple, this appears to be a fitting equivalent since both citizens and stakehold-
ers are those affected by legislation. Moreover, the inclusion of multiple 
stakeholders is congenial to the idea of partnerships. Many favour this form 
of governance arrangement precisely because it allows for the involvement of 
various groups on an equal footing. Finally, this model also offers pragmatic 
advantages. Because participation is channelled through representatives, the 
number of individuals involved in the governing bodies stays limited. This 
means that decision-making processes remain manageable, both logistically 
and financially.
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At the same time, however, the inclusion of stakeholder representatives 
raises a number of serious problems. In traditional democratic polities, citi-
zens tend to be clearly defined as all individuals of a certain age holding the 
country’s nationality.54 Stakeholder groups, by contrast, have to be defined 
individually for each project or organisation.55 This raises the critical question 
of who is recognised as a stakeholder and who takes this decision. The WCD, 
for example, while renowned for its high degree of democratic legitimacy, has 
been criticised for disregarding women and populations living downstream of 
dams as significant stakeholder groups.56
Another basic democratic principle that can turn problematic when 
applied to ‘stakeholder democracy’ is the ‘one person, one vote’ rule. Should 
all stakeholder groups have an equal number of representatives? If not, 
which criteria should be applied to weigh the influence of individual groups? 
Their size? The degree to which they are influenced by the rules? This is 
another aspect that was criticised about the work of the WCD. It operated 
on the assumption that all identified stakeholder interests should be treated 
as equally important and legitimate. Klaus Dingwerth sees this as a general 
problem of stakeholder approaches: ‘the stakeholder rhetoric, by conceptu-
ally leveling the interests of individuals or groups with different qualities of 
affectedness, conceals that not all interests are necessarily equally legitimate’ 
(Dingwerth, 2005, p. 75).
A third problem relates to the question of how stakeholder representatives 
are selected and how they can be made accountable to their stakeholder 
groups. A relatively small multi-stakeholder working group, for example, 
selected the commission members of the WCD. In addition, they were 
asked to serve in a personal capacity, rather than as representatives of their 
organisations. The commission members were therefore not accountable to 
broader stakeholder groups.57 Another partnership with a multi-stakeholder 
board is the Global Fund. It has a fixed allocation of seats for various stake-
holder groups. Each constituency is responsible for selecting its representa-
tive and can freely determine the process for doing so. Where stakeholder 
groups are well defined and well organised, this can create a democratically 
acceptable selection process. It is equally possible, however, that individual 
actors who have little accountability to the other members dominate stake-
holder groups.
Considering these opportunities and potential pitfalls, partnerships 
including stakeholder representatives in their governing bodies should com-
ply with the following standards:
Provide stakeholder representatives with real decision-making power. 
Partnerships choosing to include stakeholder representatives in their 
governing bodies should involve them in the committees that take deci-
sions relating to rules, norms and standards. If this is not the case and 
stakeholders are only included in consultative fora, partnerships have to 
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deal with problems of stakeholder selection and representation without 
reaping the democratic benefit of granting stakeholders immediate con-
trol over outcomes.
Adopt a considered definition of relevant stakeholder groups that remains 
open to review. Determining which groups should and which should 
not be represented in a partnership is always difficult. To optimise their 
approach, partnerships should go through a carefully designed stake-
holder identification process. This involves mapping all those groups 
and individuals that have an important input to make and that are sig-
nificantly affected by the partnership’s work.58 Representatives of these 
groups should be invited to participate. Crucially, partnerships should 
also have a transparent process for reconsidering their stakeholder com-
position. Thus non-participating stakeholders should be able to state their 
stake and demand representation. The partnership should have a clear 
process and criteria for deciding on such applications.
Determine the relative weight of the different stakeholder groups depend-
ing on the legitimacy of their interests and their size. The task of deter-
mining how many votes or representatives each stakeholder group should 
have is even more difficult than the process of stakeholder identification. 
To ensure their democratic accountability, partnerships should not take this 
decision purely based on the degree of power held by the various groups. 
Instead, they should consider the groups’ degree of affectedness, the legiti-
macy of their interests and the number of individuals they involve.
Follow basic democratic principles when selecting stakeholder represent-
atives. Another important aspect of democratic accountability relates to 
the method for choosing stakeholder representatives. An appropriate pro-
cedure needs to meet several requirements. Firstly, the stakeholder groups 
should be able to select their representatives themselves. Secondly, the 
groups should hold periodic elections with an open nomination proc-
ess to choose their representatives.59 Finally, the representatives should 
regularly report back to their constituencies and solicit their inputs on 
current issues and decisions.
A second possibility for enhancing participation is to conduct formal con-
sultation processes with stakeholder groups. Irrespective of the composition 
of their governance bodies, partnerships can solicit the inputs of relevant 
stakeholders while devising their work procedures, when defining rules or 
standards or when revising them.
Of the case examples discussed above, ICANN has developed compara-
tively refined consultative techniques. Thus, for example, a task force usually 
oversees each process of rule development or revision. One of the principal 
missions of the task forces is to gather information on the positions of rele-
vant constituencies. Once a draft version of the new regulation exists, ICANN 
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possible, it also holds public fora to discuss new policies. Moreover, special 
consultations are conducted with organised constituencies, like, for exam-
ple, the Government Advisory Committee, which gets involved when issues 
relating to public policy are at stake.
Formal consultations have distinct advantages as tools to enhance partici-
pation. In contrast to the inclusion of stakeholder representatives in govern-
ing bodies, they allow for the involvement of a large group of individuals and 
organisations. This enables partnerships to design their participatory proc-
esses in an open manner. As a result, groups overlooked in the stakeholder 
identification process are not permanently excluded but can contribute to 
the partnership at a later stage. Moreover, individual stakeholders can voice 
their positions and interests directly. Any complications related to differences 
within stakeholder groups, the selection of stakeholder representatives and 
their accountability to their constituencies can thus be avoided.
But consultations also have their downsides. One set of problems is linked 
to the lack of control over who gets engaged in consultations. Important 
stakeholder groups may, for example, find it difficult to get access to the nec-
essary information about the process.60 In addition, strongly affected groups 
may lack the necessary skills and resources to articulate their concerns and 
interests effectively. The risk is that few powerful, well-organised and vocal 
actors dominate the process.61
Another set of potential problems stems from the uncertainty of how the 
inputs will be used. Organisations holding consultations may use them as a 
sham to create a semblance of democratic legitimacy. Rather than seriously 
considering all contributions, these organisations may be tempted to ignore 
inputs or to selectively use only those reaffirming their original positions.62 
Poorly designed consultative processes that lack credibility may therefore fail 
to create democratic accountability as well as the ownership among stakehold-
ers that is necessary to achieve voluntary compliance with the proposed rules.
Rule-setting partnerships can opt for consultations as their preferred 
method of participation or complement the inclusion of stakeholder repre-
sentatives in governance structures through formal consultations. To design 
consultative processes in an effective and legitimate way, partnerships should 
adhere to the following principles:
Use an open consultation process. Partnerships can use a broad range of 
consultative techniques. They range from written questionnaires and com-
ments procedures for new policies to online discussion fora and in-person 
meetings or workshops.63 Irrespective of which technique is chosen, 
partnerships should design the process in an open manner, enabling the 
participation of all interested parties. Thus, for example, questionnaires 
used to gather information about the positions of different stakeholder 
groups should not only be sent to a predetermined set of stakeholders but 
should also be available for other interested parties.
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Disseminate information about the issues addressed as well as the possi-
bilities for submitting contributions widely. This is an important precon-
dition for ensuring broad participation. The dissemination effort should 
contain two elements. Firstly, partnerships should identify relevant 
stakeholders and contact them directly. Secondly, they should openly 
publish information through as many appropriate channels as possible. 
Depending on the circumstances and the types of stakeholders involved, 
this may include prominent postings on the partnership’s website, on 
newsletters and websites of thematically related organisations, in relevant 
publications, the media or on local notice boards.64
Open several consultation channels simultaneously to further increase the 
number of stakeholders involved. A range of different consultation tech-
niques was mentioned above. These methods can reach diverse audiences 
and can encourage contributions of differing quality. By using several 
consultation channels at the same time, partnerships can broaden the 
scope of both participation and types of submissions. Thus, for example, 
a partnership may at first hold personal meetings to determine whether 
and where new standards or rules are necessary. It may then distribute 
questionnaires among a wider group of stakeholders in order to collect 
information about their positions. Finally, it may open drafts of the rules 
to public comments.
Select consultation techniques suited to the needs and skills of key stake-
holder groups. When selecting avenues for consultation, partnerships 
should bear in mind that stakeholder groups can have very different 
resources and skills at their disposal. Partnerships should tailor their con-
sultation methods to the capacities of important stakeholder groups. This 
can become relevant, for example, for determining the languages used, 
for choosing between verbal or written and electronic or non-electronic 
means of communication.
Ensure a balanced representation of interests by supporting disadvantaged 
groups. In addition to choosing their consultation methods according to 
the needs of important stakeholders, partnerships should take measures 
to facilitate the participation of disadvantaged groups or  individuals. 
Disadvantaged stakeholders are those lacking the resources or skills needed 
to make their voices heard. NGOs in developing countries may, for exam-
ple, not be able to cover the travel costs for participating in international 
meetings and may have difficulties in gaining access to relevant knowl-
edge. Within communities, women or certain minorities may find it hard 
to speak out. Depending on the identity of the disadvantaged groups, 
assistance can range from financial support and capacity building to the 
use of facilitation tools designed to achieve equal participation.65
Give contributions due and equal consideration and deal with them in a 
transparent manner. Once partnerships have achieved broad and balanced 
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This implies firstly that partnerships treat submissions as objectively as 
possible. Secondly, it entails that partnerships either integrate the propos-
als in their work or provide a justification and explanation for why they 
were not taken into account.66 Thirdly, partnerships should be transparent 
in this process. A good way to create transparency is to create a collection 
or summary containing all contributions together with the partnership’s 
reactions. This document should be freely accessible to all interested par-
ties, for example by posting it on the partnership’s website.
Finally, partnerships can strengthen participation by establishing permanent 
mechanisms that allow interested parties to raise issues or voice concerns. In 
this case, partnerships do not actively solicit inputs during the rule- making 
process. Instead, stakeholders can act on their own initiative and trigger 
debates or certain policy procedures. Permanent complaints and comments 
mechanisms are a good complement to the active involvement of stakehold-
ers in partnership activities. On their own, however, they are not sufficient 
for creating an adequate level of democratic accountability for rule-setting 
partnerships.
There is a variety of tools and institutional features providing stakeholders 
with the opportunity to articulate their concerns and preferences. In addition 
to its other elaborate channels for participation, ICANN, for example, has insti-
tuted several mechanisms to deal with stakeholder complaints. This includes 
a reconsideration policy, an independent review policy and the office of an 
ombudsman.67 Thus anybody materially affected by an ICANN action can 
request the ICANN board to reconsider this action. A special board committee 
decides within 30 days whether or not it accepts the request and is obliged to 
justify any rejections. Within 90 days, the committee should forward its final 
recommendation to the board. All reconsideration requests and subsequent 
decisions are published on ICANN’s website. The independent review policy 
covers instances when actions by ICANN or its staff are deemed inconsistent 
with its articles of incorporation or by-laws. An independent international 
arbitrator handles these complaints. Finally, ICANN has an ombudsman who 
deals with any disputes not covered by the other two mechanisms. The mis-
sion of the ombudsman is to resolve conflicts informally, relying, for example, 
on negotiations, facilitation or ‘shuttle diplomacy’. Other procedures com-
mon in many democratic polities, though not applied by any of the partner-
ships discussed as case examples here, include formal petitions as well as the 
possibility to introduce draft norms to the rule-setting process.68
Open comments and complaints procedures create important benefits in 
terms of democratic accountability: They are usually open to contributions 
from all interested parties and they allow stakeholders to decide when and 
on what they want to comment. Thus they complement both main alterna-
tives for the inclusion of stakeholders well. They enhance the democratic 
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accountability of partnerships including stakeholder representatives in their 
governing bodies because they enable all stakeholders, including those that 
may not have representation, to voice their interests and concerns directly. 
Partnerships relying on stakeholder consultations often have access to a 
broader group of interested parties, but they tend to solicit their inputs on 
very specific questions. Open comments and complaints procedures can 
strengthen democratic accountability here by broadening both the scope of 
issues open for comment and the time frame for submitting contributions. 
Due to these benefits, both ISO guide 59 and the ISEAL code of good practice 
for standard-setting organisations recommend the institutionalisation of 
comments and complaints mechanisms.69
At the same time, however, open comments and complaints procedures 
face strong limitations as instruments of democratic accountability. Firstly, 
the contributions received are very unlikely to provide a representative picture 
of the different stakeholder interests relating to any specific issue. Since inter-
ested parties submit comments on their own initiative, a systematic collection 
of viewpoints on a specific issue does not usually take place. Moreover, it is 
very likely that well-informed, well-resourced and vocal interests dominate 
these open comment mechanisms. Lack of control over who gets involved 
was already mentioned as a problem in stakeholder consultations. It is 
strongly exacerbated in open comments and complaints procedures, however, 
since they usually do not involve any process of stakeholder identification or 
proactive outreach to disadvantaged groups.
A second problem relates to the effectiveness of comments or complaints in 
generating changes. Many institutions inviting open comments do not clarify 
how these inputs are treated. And even where a procedure is defined, such as 
the right to receive a reply that is guaranteed by various European institutions, 
the influence of comments on the policy process may remain unclear. As a 
result, open comments and complaints procedures easily lack credibility and 
stakeholders may not have sufficient incentives for using these avenues for 
participation. Therefore, open comments and complaints procedures cannot 
generate appropriate democratic accountability if used on their own. In con-
junction with other participatory techniques, however, they can be beneficial.
To reap the benefits of open comments and complaints procedures while 
avoiding their pitfalls, partnerships should adhere to the following related 
principles:
Generate possibilities for submitting open comments and complaints as 
a complement to other procedures for participation. Rule-setting partner-
ships should allow for continuous comments relating to any aspect of 
their work. These comments and complaints procedures should, however, 
only be used as a complement and not as an alternative for other means 
of participation.
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Broadly disseminate information on how and when interested parties can 
comment or complain. Open comments and complaints procedures do 
not usually allow partnerships to actively identify and contact relevant 
stakeholder groups. To encourage widespread use of the mechanisms and 
increase the representative nature of submissions, partnerships should 
as a minimum explain clearly how the comments and complaints pro-
cedures work. This information should be made easily accessible to all 
interested parties.
Use open comments and complaints to raise issues, rather than as a 
decision-making procedure. As discussed above, it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to receive a representative sample of stakeholder views through 
open comments and complaints. The main function of comments and 
complaints procedures should therefore be agenda setting. Issues raised by 
interested parties should then be discussed and resolved with the help of 
other, more representative, participatory tools.
Define a procedure for dealing with comments or complaints. To make 
their comments and complaints procedures credible, partnerships should 
have a clear process for handling contributions. This process should 
provide some guarantee that legitimate inputs are treated properly, while 
allowing partnerships to reject insincere or immaterial comments. As a 
minimum, everybody submitting a comment or complaint should be 
granted the right to receive a reply outlining how the partnership will 
deal with the submission or justifying why the contribution is rejected.
Ensure transparency in dealing with comments and complaints. Finally, 
to further strengthen the credibility of the process, partnerships should 
handle comments and complaints in a transparent way. This entails firstly 
that the procedures for managing comments and complaints are clearly 
defined and easily accessible to all interested parties. Secondly, it involves 
collecting and regularly publishing the inputs received as well as the cor-
responding reactions.
5.2.2.2 Provide stakeholders with relevant information, knowledge and skills
Transparency has repeatedly been discussed in this book as an essential ingre-
dient for any type of accountability. Following the basic model of account-
ability outlined in section 2.2.1, access to relevant information is crucial 
because it enables principals to evaluate the behaviour of their agents. For a 
different reason, transparency is once more key at this juncture. Democratic 
accountability, it was argued above, is to an important degree about giving 
those affected a say in the rule-making process. Effective stakeholder partici-
pation, however, cannot be guaranteed solely by instituting formal possibili-
ties for participation. Stakeholders are only able to execute their rights and 
provide meaningful inputs if they are equipped with the necessary informa-
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In his frequently quoted and powerful words, James Madison describes 
the importance of knowledge for democratic government as follows:
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of 
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. 
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be 
their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowl-
edge gives.
(Hunt, 1900–10, Vol. 1, Chap. 18, Doc. 35)70
Organisations like Privacy International, which runs a major campaign for 
freedom of information legislation, emphasise the link between access to 
information and the ability to participate:
Democracy is based on the consent of the citizens and that consent turns 
on the government informing citizens about their activities and recogniz-
ing the right to participate. The public is only truly able to participate in 
the democratic process when they have information about the activities 
and policies of the government.
(Banisar, 2006, p. 6)
Because of its centrality to both accountability in general and to participa-
tion, transparency has become a very broadly recognised standard of demo-
cratic governance. Thus, for instance, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights rec-
ognise the right to seek, receive and impart information.71 Moreover, the 
UN Convention against Corruption requires governments to take measures 
to enhance the transparency of their public administration and the Rio 
Declaration demands access to environmental information to enable par-
ticipation.72 The importance of transparency is also increasingly reflected in 
government practice. Thus by 2006 70 countries from across the globe had 
adopted comprehensive freedom of information legislation, while another 
50 were in the process of developing it.73
Consequently, the codes defining governance norms for standard-set-
ting organisations also emphasise transparency. Both, ISO guide 59 and the 
ISEAL code of good practice, demand that standard-setting organisations 
publish their future work programmes or notify stakeholders of upcoming 
decisions, make available copies of the draft standards, publish approved 
standards promptly and document the process of standard development. 
Beyond that, ISEAL proposes that organisations publish all received com-
ments, as well as the ensuing reactions and that they create a dedicated focal 
point for enquiries to facilitate the provision of information.74
As discussed in section 2.2.2.4, as well as in section 4.2.3, transparency can 
concern many different aspects of an organisation. Several of these areas are 
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relevant in the context of participation. For stakeholders to be able to deliver 
meaningful inputs, they need sufficient information about the rule-setting 
process, including the schedule of planned activities and the procedures for 
submitting contributions, as well as the subject matter under consideration. 
To strengthen the credibility of the process, two further elements of transpar-
ency are instrumental. Firstly, organisations should handle submissions in a 
transparent way so that stakeholders know how their contributions influence 
the rule-setting process. Secondly, transparency on their financial sources 
can help address potential concerns about a partnership’s independence and 
objectivity.
Organisations can take very different steps to create transparency. Which 
activities are required to generate an adequate level of transparency depends 
on the nature of the stakeholders involved. In the case of ICANN, for exam-
ple, affected stakeholders are by definition engaged in activities related to 
the Internet. Therefore, it seems appropriate for ICANN to rely mainly on 
electronic means of communication to publish and disseminate relevant 
information. For partnerships dealing with well-organised and well-informed 
stakeholders, moreover, a relatively passive approach to information dissemi-
nation may be sufficient. EITI, for instance, predominantly addresses mul-
tinational companies active in the extractive industries that have a strong 
interest in and awareness of international norm-setting processes. The WCD, 
by contrast, faced different requirements. Among its key stakeholders were 
local communities affected by dam-building projects. To inform them and 
encourage their participation, on-site meetings, non-electronic communica-
tion, active outreach, capacity building and the use of local languages were 
essential.
This dependence on context makes it difficult to establish general stand-
ards relating to the concrete modalities necessary for generating appropriate 
levels of transparency. Nevertheless rule-setting partnerships should respect 
the following principles to create the conditions for effective participation:
Provide and disseminate information about the rule-setting process, the 
procedures for participating, the subject matter under consideration, the 
way contributions are dealt with and the partnership’s financial sources.
Choose the format and language for providing and disseminating infor-
mation depending on the needs and capacities of key stakeholders. A basic 
starting point for partnerships is to publish relevant information online. In 
many cases, however, information will have to be available in several lan-
guages and may require the use of non-electronic forms of communication.
Where necessary, reach out actively to disadvantaged stakeholders and 
provide them with training and capacity building. As described in the pre-
vious section, measures to support disadvantaged stakeholder groups may 
include the organisation of separate meetings, capacity building, man-
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Respond appropriately to inquiries from third parties. Partnerships should 
be prepared to make information available in response to inquiries from 
interested parties. To do so in an appropriate way, partnerships should 
have an agreed information policy, which defines, where necessary, 
legitimate confidentiality areas. They should also respond to inquiries in 
a timely manner.
5.2.3 Accountability to avoid the abuse of authority
Parliamentary accountability mechanisms, it was argued above, aim not only 
at allowing affected parties a say in the norm-setting process but also seek 
to prevent the abuse of legislative authority. For that purpose, democracies 
have devised a range of different mechanisms. Citizens can use their right to 
vote to replace parliaments abusing their authority. Constitutional rules limit 
parliamentary authority and protect basic rights. These rules can usually not 
be changed through a simple parliamentary act but require popular referenda 
or supermajorities. Systems of checks and balances, moreover, enable other 
governmental bodies to control legislative action. Most importantly, the judi-
ciary can use the process of judicial review to determine the constitutionality 
and rule conformity of legislative acts. Depending on the political system, the 
executive can also play an important role in exercising political oversight, for 
example through its right of veto or its authority to dissolve the parliament.
Compared to the complex institutional set-up of democratic govern-
ments, the rule-setting partnerships analysed here have adopted only few 
similar accountability mechanisms. In many cases, partnership boards take 
the final decision on new or amended rules. The procedures for selecting 
partnership boards vary, but rarely include fully democratic elections. Thus, 
for example, the stakeholder council formally appoints the GRI board. The 
council, however, can only accept or reject a slate of candidates proposed 
by a nominating committee, which contains a majority of board members. 
ICANN used to conduct general elections for its board but now relies on a 
nominating committee and a fixed stakeholder composition.
In some of the case examples, the partnerships are also able to unilaterally 
change their mandates and authorities. GRI’s board, for example, can amend 
the partnership’s articles of association with a two-thirds majority. The 
WCD, by contrast, had its mandate clearly defined by an initial stakeholder 
workshop. Similarly, ICANN cannot autonomously change its constitutional 
documents, since they are contained in a contract with the US-American 
government.
The weakest point, however, relates to the partnerships’ systems of checks 
and balances. In the case examples, power is often strongly concentrated. 
The authority to adopt rules, for example, is in most cases invested in a 
single body, be it the board, a meeting of partners or a multi-stakeholder 
committee. ICANN is the only exception here. It has a policy that is simi-
lar to judicial review. Through its independent review process, an external 
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arbitrator can establish whether or not actions taken by the partnership are 
consistent with its by-laws and articles of incorporation.
Should it be a cause for concern if rule-setting partnerships do not match 
most institutional features of parliamentary accountability? In answering 
this question, we have to distinguish between various levels of accountabil-
ity and between two kinds of rule-setting partnerships. Firstly, it was estab-
lished in the first section of this chapter that all partnerships need to fulfil 
certain minimum requirements for their governance and internal control 
structures. These provide a basic protection against the abuse of authority 
and all rule-setting partnerships have to comply with them. Secondly, it was 
argued that the accountability arrangements espoused by rule-setting part-
nerships do not have to be identical, but should be functionally equivalent 
to democratic accountability mechanisms. What functional equivalence 
entails in this context, however, strongly depends on the potential of 
organisations to abuse their legislative authority. In this respect, there is a 
significant difference between institutions that can pass binding rules and 
those that can only propose voluntary rules. The standards defined in the 
following paragraphs therefore distinguish between these two cases.
5.2.3.1 Partnerships proposing voluntary rules: No additional measures 
are necessary
Parliaments have the authority to set rules that are binding for all those 
within the jurisdiction of the state. These rules are usually not only binding 
in theory but can be enforced by the judiciary and executive branches of gov-
ernment. Most rule-setting partnerships, by contrast, only have the authority 
to propose non-binding rules. They rely on voluntary compliance and are 
not linked to strong enforcement mechanisms. The Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights, for example, already contain their voluntary 
nature in their title. Both governments and companies can decide freely 
whether or not they want to join the initiative. Once they have subscribed 
to the principles, all participants commit to promoting the principles and to 
reporting publicly on the activities undertaken in their support. Similarly, 
the transparency principles and templates proposed by EITI are adopted 
voluntarily by governments and companies involved in the extractive indus-
tries. By comparison, the standards developed by the WCD enjoy greater 
authority. They have become a reference point for many debates and deci-
sions relating to the construction of large dams.75 The standards, however, 
derive their authority mainly from the comprehensive and inclusive process 
that led to their development. Formally, any acceptance of the standards is 
entirely voluntary.
Partnerships developing voluntary rules, though, can hardly abuse their leg-
islative authority. Stakeholders concerned about the process of rule develop-
ment or the content of the proposed rules can always reject them. Should, for 
example, GRI proclaim new standards in an area unrelated to  sustainability 
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reporting or should those norms violate basic rights, affected parties can 
withhold their ex-post authorisation and refuse to comply with the rules. The 
stakeholders of partnerships setting voluntary rules thus enjoy automatic pro-
tection against the abuse of legislative authority. Therefore, there is no need 
for these partnerships to adopt additional measures to achieve functional 
equivalence with parliamentary accountability.
5.2.3.2 Partnerships setting binding rules: Authorisation, mandate, 
judicial review
While most partnerships define voluntary rules, some are in a position to 
set norms with a binding character. This can be the case, for example, where 
stakeholders depend strongly on a partnership. The dependence can be cre-
ated through financial links, strong power asymmetries or through the neces-
sity of working with one common system of rules. Partnerships can also be 
authorised by the relevant authorities to take binding decisions. In classical 
corporatist arrangements, for instance, partnerships can define rules relating 
to labour.
Among the case examples, ICANN is the only partnership asserting that 
its rules are binding. As an analyst puts it:
ICANN, in short, was both asserting control over the design of the name 
space and imposing constraints on people using that space. ICANN’s 
exercise of authority looked, walked, and quacked like public regulatory 
power.
(Weinberg, 2000, p. 217)
ICANN was created through an agreement with the US government. As such, 
it lacks appropriate authorisation for issuing policies and rules that are bind-
ing for the entire Internet community. Its stipulations also lack the backing 
of a compulsory enforcement system. But the nature of its task provides its 
decisions with strong authority. ICANN regulates the definition and assign-
ment of Internet domain names and ensures that each name is linked to 
a unique IP address. This is a condition for the smooth functioning of the 
Internet.76 In theory, other organisations could set up domain name registers 
outside the realm of ICANN. Yet this would undermine the functioning of 
the entire system. In actual practice, ICANN’s policies and rules therefore 
enjoy a strongly binding character.77
Where partnerships set rules with a strongly binding character, stakehold-
ers do not enjoy automatic protection from a potential abuse of legislative 
authority. Additional accountability measures akin to those used for parlia-
ments or independent regulatory agencies are therefore necessary:78
Achieve appropriate and revocable authorisation for the partnership. 
Partnerships with the power to set binding rules should derive their 
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authority from appropriate external bodies. For partnerships active at the 
international level, appropriate authorisation can either be granted by 
intergovernmental bodies or by affected stakeholders. In either case, the 
delegating body should be in a position to revoke or renew its authorisa-
tion. For intergovernmental organisations this entails retaining the right 
to withdraw the authorisation and entrust another organisation with the 
task. Where stakeholders delegate the necessary authority directly, they 
should either make up the rule-setting body themselves or periodically 
elect its members.
Define a clear mandate delimiting the partnership’s authority. Rule-
 setting partnerships should have mandates that spell out clearly where 
the partnership has authority and where it does not. It is also important 
that the mandate cannot be changed unilaterally by the partnership. The 
first definition as well as any significant changes of the mandate should 
require the consent of the relevant authorising bodies.
Partnership activities should be subject to a process of judicial review. 
Finally, allegations that a partnership violates its mandate or critical pro-
cedural rules should be subject to authoritative review by an independent 
body. All interested parties should be able to submit cases, at least if their 
concerns can be shown to be substantial. This also makes it necessary to 
devise a reasonable way to deal with the costs arising from the procedure 
so that they do not constitute a material barrier against bringing cases. To 
be effective, the independent arbitrator or review panel should also be in a 
position to pass final and binding decisions on the matters referred to it.
5.2.4 Summary of standards
Table 5.2 provides an overview of relevant accountability standards for rule 
setting and regulation partnerships.
•
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Provide stakeholder representatives 
with real decision-making power
Adopt a considered definition of 
relevant stakeholder groups that 
remains open to review
Determine the weight of stakeholder 
groups depending on the legitimacy of 
their interests and their size
Follow basic democratic principles 














Use an open consultation process
Widely disseminate information about 
issues addressed and possibilities for 
submitting contributions
Open several consultation channels 
simultaneously
Select consultation techniques 
suited to the needs and skills of key 
stakeholder groups
Ensure a balanced representation of 
interests by supporting disadvantaged 
groups
Give contributions due and equal 









Establish comment and complaints 
procedures as a complement to other 
participatory mechanisms
Broadly disseminate information on 
how and when to use the comment or 
complaints procedures
Use comments and complaints to raise 
issues, rather than to settle them
Specify a process for dealing with 
comments or complaints, including 
at least a guaranteed formal reply to all 
submissions
Ensure transparency in dealing with 
comments and complaints
Transparency Create transparency relating to rule-
setting process, the procedures for 
participating, the subject matter under 
consideration, the way contributions 
are dealt with and the partnership’s 
financial sources
Choose the format and language 
for providing and disseminating 
information depending on the needs 
and capacities of stakeholders
Where necessary, reach out actively 
to disadvantaged stakeholders and 
provide them with training and 
capacity building
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5.3 Standards for implementation partnerships
A third group of partnerships identified among the case examples focuses 
directly on policy implementation. The term ‘implementation partnership’ 
sometimes generates confusion because almost all partnerships engage in 
some form of implementation. Partnerships typically set their agendas, 
develop policies and then seek to implement them. The label for this group of 
partnerships, however, does not refer to the partnerships’ internal processes. 
Rather, it describes which part of the global policy cycle the partnerships seek 
to contribute to.79 In this context, implementation partnerships differ from 
the partnerships described thus far. Advocacy and awareness-raising partner-
ships seek to influence how a policy problem is defined and how central it 
is on the political agenda. Rule-setting partnerships add to the decision and 
policymaking stage. Implementation partnerships, by contrast, seek to sup-
port the implementation of set policies by contributing necessary resources.
Implementation partnerships thus have to mobilise substantial resources 
beyond those needed to finance their own core operations. During the finan-
cial year 2006, for example, GAIN received over US$7.6 million in donations, 
GAVI received US$250 million, Stop TB had an income of US$42 million and 
for the Global Fund, pledges worth over two billion US dollars were due in 
2006. These partnerships all focus on public health problems – a compara-
tively non-controversial and highly visible policy area. Their main donors are 
typically governments as well as large corporations or private philanthropic 
organisations. Governments, for instance, provide most of the resources for 
the Global Fund, whereas the Gates Foundation is the dominant donor for 
GAIN and GAVI.
This means that to be successful, implementation partnerships need 
to achieve the delegation of authority over resources at a very different 













need no additional 
accountability 
Stakeholders enjoy automatic 
protection against the abuse of 
legislative authority through their right 
to reject rules
Partnerships setting 




Achieve appropriate and revocable 
authorisation for the partnership
Define a clear mandate, delimiting the 
partnership’s authority
Subject partnership activities to a 
process of judicial review
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 problem usually have many options on how to allocate their resources. 
Other things being equal, they are likely to spend their funds in the way 
that is seen as most effective in addressing the problem.80 Therefore, imple-
mentation partnerships need to demonstrate their efficiency and effective-
ness in achieving development outcomes. In addition to the basic forms of 
accountability required for all partnerships, implementation partnerships 
should thus emphasise accountability for outcomes. This accountability 
constellation is depicted in Figure 5.3.
This is not to say that outcome accountability cannot be relevant to other 
forms of partnerships as well. Since all partnerships depend to some extent 
on the delegation of authority over resources, it is always beneficial if they 
can demonstrate efficiency and effectiveness in their operations. Yet the 
discussion about financial accountability earlier has already shown that the 
scale of financial contributions matters for defining which accountability 
standards are appropriate. Creating accountability for outcomes is always 
costly and often very difficult. Implementation partnerships typically oper-
ate with greater resources than other types of partnerships. Moreover, they 
focus directly on effecting development outcomes so that their work tends 
to lend itself more easily to measurement and results-based evaluation. The 
ensuing principles of outcome accountability are therefore only defined as 
expected standards for implementation partnerships.
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5.3.1 Applying corporate accountability standards to partnerships
Attempts to create or increase accountability for outcomes can be observed 
in all sectors. The archetypal area of practice for outcome accountability, 
however, is the corporate sector. Therefore, this section briefly revisits the 
mechanisms at work in corporate accountability and discusses how these 
principles can be transferred to implementation partnerships.81
Accountability arrangements in corporations focus overwhelmingly on 
creating accountability for outcomes. This happens at several levels, only 
some of which an individual company can influence. Firstly, the classical 
tool for ensuring companies’ efficient and effective operations is the market. 
A well-functioning market is characterised by competition between various 
providers of similar goods and services and the availability of adequate infor-
mation about these goods and services. Under these conditions, consumers 
can choose the products that best suit their needs and that offer the best 
quality for the relatively lowest price. Since consumption behaviour decides 
on the economic survival of individual firms, the competition inherent in a 
functioning market puts companies under continuous pressure to optimise 
their processes and improve their performance as seen by consumers.
Secondly, the majority of larger companies today are run by professional 
managers. Owners, who delegate the authority over their resources to man-
agers, have developed a range of mechanisms to make them accountable for 
performance. These aim either at aligning the interests of managers to those 
of the owners or at improving the monitoring of managers. The mechanisms 
include several forms of sanctions and incentives, such as hiring and firing 
policies, performance-related compensation and the option for owners to sell 
their stake in the company. They also include tools to improve monitoring 
by reducing the information asymmetry between owners and managers, for 
example through strict accounting, reporting and auditing standards as well 
as the institution of a supervisory board.
In many respects, implementation partnerships work under different cir-
cumstances than companies. Firstly, they often provide goods or services for 
which there is no or a very constrained market. The implementation partner-
ships among the case examples analysed here, for example, all address public 
health issues with a focus on developing countries. The partnerships’ benefi-
ciaries usually do not have to pay at all or at least not for the full cost of the 
goods or services they receive. Secondly, implementation partnerships usu-
ally do not face competition in the traditional sense. The partnerships were 
created to fill existing gaps in the provision of goods and services. Often, 
therefore, there are no or few alternative providers of similar goods and serv-
ices. And even where various providers coexist, they do not tend to compete 
for ‘customers’. Their ultimate goal is not to make a profit but to provide 
a public service, and their economic survival depends on the continued 
commitment of donors, rather than the individual choices of beneficiaries. 
Concrete Partnership Accountability Standards  145
Finally, partnerships usually lack a clearly defined performance measure that 
would be comparable to a corporation’s financial bottom line.
Given these differences, how can corporate accountability standards be 
applied to partnerships? Over recent years, both public and civil society 
organisations have experimented with introducing results-focused account-
ability mechanisms in their work. These experiences have shown that the 
translation of private sector principles for the public and non-profit sectors 
faces some inherent limitations. At the same time, however, a range of mech-
anisms were introduced to strengthen accountability for outcomes. These 
include a focus on performance evaluations, as well as the introduction of 
market elements in the provision of public goods and services.
5.3.2 Outcome accountability through performance evaluation
Creating accountability for outcomes entails assessing the performance of 
an organisation or individual against a certain yardstick or measure.82 In 
the corporate sector, a clearly defined, common yardstick exists. No matter 
what product or service a company offers and no matter which additional 
objectives individual owners pursue, all companies share one goal. This 
goal is firstly to ensure the company’s economic survival and secondly to 
maximise profits.
Government agencies, NGOs and partnerships, by contrast, work on 
a non-profit basis. They may share an interest in institutional survival. 
Beyond that, however, they have no common or equally clearly defined 
bottom line. In the words of an analyst commenting on the difficulties 
involved in assessing the organisational performance of NGOs:
NGOs must contend with the fact that they belong to a category of organ-
isation with no straightforward or uncontested measure of organisational, 
as distinct from project, effectiveness. In other words […] non-profits have 
no readily acknowledged ‘bottom line’.
(Fowler, 1995, p. 147)83
To build accountability for outcomes, implementation partnerships should 
nevertheless try to assess their performance. As a first step, this necessitates 
setting clear goals and targets. As a second step, it requires monitoring per-
formance and linking it to incentives for performance improvement.
5.3.2.1 Define clear objectives and performance targets
Organisations can only evaluate their performance if they have clearly 
defined organisational objectives that can be translated into measurable 
performance targets. The implementation partnerships among the case 
examples all emphasise the definition of goals and targets. Yet they differ 
both in the clarity of the targets chosen and the level at which performance 
is evaluated.
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GAIN, for example, set itself the target of reaching one billion people at risk 
of malnutrition with fortified foods by 2008 and has defined several indicators 
for tracking organisational performance.84 Similarly, Stop TB has committed 
itself to reaching time-bound targets relating to the diagnosis, treatment and 
prevention of TB. To date, however, it has not established performance criteria 
that would indicate how the partnership’s activities contribute to reaching 
these goals.85 Similarly, RBM emphasises quantified objectives in the overall 
fight against malaria without singling out its own contribution to that goal.86 
GAVI and the Global Fund, by contrast, have defined both overall outcome 
targets (reflected in performance agreements with recipient countries) and 
quantified, time-bound performance measures for their own activities.87
With the growing popularity of results-based management strategies over 
recent years, many government agencies and civil society organisations 
have made first experiences with quantified goals and performance targets. 
This is especially the case in countries with an Anglo-American background, 
including the UK, the US, Canada, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand. The 
introduction of performance measures is particularly popular in policy areas 
like public health, education, welfare and development.88 The effects of these 
measures are controversial and have generated much academic and political 
debate.89
Analysts have identified several potential problems related to the defini-
tion of clear organisational objectives and their translation into measurable 
performance indicators in the public sector and in civil society organisations. 
Due to these problems, it is disputed whether or not performance indicators 
improve efficiency and strengthen accountability for outcomes.90
A first problem is that performance measures tend to be simple indicators 
that can easily fail to reflect the complexity of the issue addressed. Matthew 
Diller finds this to be the case with the indicators chosen during the welfare 
reform in the US and believes that the problem is not easy to remedy:
In the new regime that focuses on results, the most visible and quantifi-
able of outcomes become the most important. […] While performance-
based government may be effective if the goal is defined in terms as 
simple and unequivocal as caseload reduction, the introduction of caveats 
and countervailing interests may render it ineffective as a means of estab-
lishing central control.
(Diller, 2000, pp. 1183 and 1184)
Secondly, several analysts find that the indicators chosen to measure per-
formance are often not sufficiently clearly related to the organisation’s 
overall goals. Propper and Wilson, for example, cite a study on the effects 
of the performance measures introduced as part of the US Job Training and 
Partnership Act of 1982. The study finds that most performance indicators 
are evaluated on a short-term basis and that as a result,
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the long term added-value goals are not met. Instead, the short-term PMs 
[performance measures] that are used in their place are either uncorre-
lated with, or negatively correlated with, long-term value added.
(Propper and Wilson, 2003, p. 257)
Thirdly, as a result of poorly chosen indicators, managers and staff can face 
perverse incentives. Thus, for example, the focus on standardised school tests 
may force teachers who are genuinely interested in furthering their students’ 
knowledge, ability to learn and think critically to ‘teach to the test’ and 
neglect their broader educational objectives.91
Implementation partnerships intent on strengthening their accountability 
for outcomes should learn from the controversial experiences made in the 
public sector and in civil society organisations and adhere to the following 
standards when defining their organisational objectives and performance 
targets:
Invest significant efforts into the definition of organisational objectives 
and performance targets. Experiences with the introduction of perform-
ance measures in the public sector and in civil society organisations 
have shown that poorly chosen performance indicators can be counter-
productive. Because of their strong focus on outcome accountability, 
implementation partnerships must evaluate their performance. In order 
to avoid the potential problems related to indicator selection, they 
should, however, be prepared to invest the necessary effort to establish a 
well-designed system for performance evaluation.
Demonstrate how performance indicators are linked to and will lead 
to the achievement of broader organisational objectives. A first crucial 
requirement is that the indicators chosen are positively correlated to 
the partnership’s goals. Where possible, the indicators should therefore 
include measures directly assessing changes in the intended outcomes. 
Moreover, partnerships should establish exactly how their own activities 
are intended to contribute to the desired goal and develop a strategy for 
evaluating these activities as well as their effects.
Involve stakeholders in the definition of goals and indicators. 
Implementation partnerships typically seek to deliver a good or service to 
an underserved community. An important aspect of performance is thus 
to what degree and how partnership activities affect the position or wel-
fare of their target groups. The affected individuals or groups themselves 
are best placed to establish which elements are most important for their 
well-being. They should therefore be strongly involved in the definition 
of performance indicators for implementation partnerships.92
Combine objective and subjective, as well as quantitative and qualitative 
indicators. To avoid some of the potential counterproductive effects of 
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a mix of different kinds of indicators. Thus they should not only rely 
on objective data, such as a reduction in waiting times or the number 
of goods delivered, but also on subjective data, such as service satisfac-
tion or individual welfare assessments. To avoid the misinterpretation of 
quantitative data, moreover, the inclusion of qualitative data collection 
methods can be very helpful.
5.3.2.2 Monitor performance and create incentives for performance 
improvement
By establishing clear objectives and performance indicators or targets, organi-
sations create the basis for evaluating their activities and clarify expectations 
for their behaviour. Following the basic model of accountability proposed in 
section 2.2.1, creating accountability additionally requires collecting infor-
mation about the agent’s behaviour and defining sanctions and incentives 
to encourage compliance or improvement. To effectively strengthen their 
accountability for outcomes, implementation partnerships should therefore 
monitor performance and create incentives to improve it.
The corporate sector strongly emphasises the necessity of accurate per-
formance measurement and reporting. Especially for publicly traded com-
panies, most relevant aspects relating to accounting, reporting and auditing 
are strictly regulated. Thus, for example, accountants and auditors have to 
comply with strict professional norms concerning both their training and 
the principles they apply. Moreover, most governments have passed legal 
regulations determining what information has to be recorded, when and 
how it has to be reported and whether it has to receive independent con-
firmation. As mentioned earlier, companies and their managers also face 
manifold incentives for performing well.
In the public and civil society sectors, by contrast, only certain aspects 
relating to financial accounting and reporting are subject to regulations. For 
the monitoring and reporting of performance results, no similar rules exist. 
Those government agencies and NGOs, however, that have determined per-
formance indicators for their work, are also often monitoring and reporting 
on their performance. Whether and how performance results are linked to 
sanctions or incentives differs strongly. In some instances, for example, per-
formance data are made public and influence the organisation’s reputation. 
Even if only used internally or shared with donors, though, performance 
results can have an impact on promotions, on budget developments and the 
conclusion of new contracts.
Again, analysts have pointed to a number of potential problems and com-
plications that can arise in the context of performance measurement in the 
public and non-profit sectors.93 A first risk is that staff and managers manipu-
late performance data to their own advantage. Courty and Marschke, for 
example, analyse the phenomenon of ‘gaming’ in government organisations. 
They find that when agents strategically report their performance outcomes 
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to maximise their awards, this can have a negative impact on the real goals of 
the organisation (Courty and Marschke, 2004). In addition to gaming, Peter 
Smith describes how the publication of performance data in the UK tempts 
officials to misrepresent data (Smith, 1995).
Secondly, researchers have found that a strong focus on quantitative 
performance targets can inhibit organisational learning. Thus, for instance, 
Thomas Freeman finds that as performance indicators are used to create 
external accountability and verification, they can undermine the condi-
tions necessary for quality improvement (Freeman, 2002). Similarly, Alnoor 
Ebrahim contends that too much accountability can hinder NGOs in achiev-
ing their missions. More specifically, his concern is ‘about instances of too 
narrowly focused upward accountability – where donor demands for infor-
mation are satisfied at the expense of longer-term processes of organizational 
learning’ (Ebrahim, 2005, p. 81).
Finally, performance measurement in the public and non-profit sectors is 
often confronted with complex technical problems. Relevant reliable and 
valid data are often difficult to come by. Moreover, in complex policy areas, 
it can be very hard to establish cause and effect or to measure the impact 
of an individual organisation on the final outcome.94 As Hugo Slim puts it 
for NGOs:
[T]he current art and science of social and environmental accounting 
is truly complex on occasion. Accounting for the impact or outcome of 
NGO work can be uncertain, is usually contested and can border on pure 
speculation at times as NGOs try to track cause and effect between their 
actions and the personal, social, economic, environmental and political 
change around their projects.
(Slim, 2002, p. 4)
For implementation partnerships, these experiences contain the following 
lessons:
Consider issues relating to performance measurement already during the 
planning process and start collecting data early. To assess the impact of 
partnership (or other organisations’) activities on a public policy problem, 
it is standard practice to compare the actual situation to a counterfac-
tual, that is, to the hypothetical case in which the activities did not take 
place.95 To construct a convincing counterfactual, data describing the 
situation prior to the intervention are of central importance. Therefore, 
implementation partnerships should ensure they have access to or should 
collect relevant data as early as possible.
Ensure objectivity of data and their presentation. Implementation part-
nerships can take various steps to reduce the risk of data manipulation 
and misrepresentation. Firstly, they can try to rely on external sources 
•
•
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of data, such as independent opinion polls or official statistics. Secondly, 
they can task independent agencies of good reputation to collect data on 
their behalf. Thirdly, they should conform to relevant existing rules con-
cerning accounting, reporting and auditing.96
Encourage learning by emphasising positive incentives. Performance 
evaluations have long been seen to pursue two purposes: creating account-
ability and encouraging learning.97 Where accountability, however, means 
punishment,98 it encourages a risk-averse culture and thus undermines 
efforts to learn from past experience and improve performance. To over-
come the apparent accountability–learning dichotomy, implementation 
partnerships should involve their staff and managers in the evaluation 
process and reward good performance rather than simply punishing bad 
performance.99 Moreover, partnerships should avoid giving perverse incen-
tives. This is the case, for example, when current performance is used to 
determine future performance targets, which effectively punishes good 
performers.
5.3.3 Outcome accountability through the introduction of 
market elements
In the private sector, functioning markets have two main effects on outcome 
accountability. Competition creates continuous pressure on companies to 
enhance the efficiency of their operations. In addition, consumer choice 
gives individuals a powerful means of expressing their preferences and of 
indicating which products best fit their needs.
In the public sector, various strategies have been used to introduce market 
elements in the provision of public goods and services. In some areas, full 
privatisation is possible. Many governments have privatised formerly public 
utilities such as the providers of gas, water, electricity or telecommunica-
tion services, which share many characteristics of private goods.100 In many 
other areas, however, governments do not consider privatisation a desirable 
option.101 Instead of full privatisation, many governments have tried to intro-
duce alternative means for creating the two effects described above. In order 
to generate competition, many governments delegate important tasks to pri-
vate providers, using competitive bidding processes for allocating contracts.102 
Outsourcing can subject private and public service providers to competitive 
pressures. Most often, however, beneficiaries cannot make ‘consumption 
choices’ on those products and therefore play little or no role in assessing the 
quality and efficiency of the services provided. To remedy the situation in this 
context as well as in cases where government agencies continue to act as serv-
ice providers, governments often employ client satisfaction surveys, recipient 
focus groups or similar means to collect beneficiary feedback.103
What lessons do these experiences hold for implementation partnerships? 
Full privatisation is usually not a viable alternative for the partnerships under 
consideration here. Their objective is to contribute to the achievement of 
•
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public policy goals and to deliver goods and services in areas not sufficiently 
served by governments or companies. On their own, markets are therefore 
unlikely to generate the desired outcomes. The options for partnerships to 
increase their outcome accountability through the introduction of market 
elements thus include outsourcing and the gathering of beneficiary feedback. 
In both areas, partnerships should take on board the lessons learnt from simi-
lar experiences made by the public sector and civil society organisations.
5.3.3.1 Outsource suitable tasks through competitive bidding processes
Implementation partnerships can introduce an element of competition in 
their work by outsourcing certain tasks to competing providers. Among the 
case examples, almost all implementation partnerships allocate a significant 
amount of their resources to third providers. The Global Fund has gone 
furthest in this respect. It exclusively operates as a financial instrument, 
providing grants enabling other organisations to implement policies to fight 
AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. In its ‘performance-based grant making’, the 
Global Fund emphasises results. Thus funding proposals are evaluated by 
a technical review committee before the board takes decisions; local fund 
agents assess the financial management and administrative capacities of 
recipients; success indicators and reporting requirements are agreed with the 
recipient agency and included in the contract; regular progress reports and 
audits are conducted on programmes and ongoing disbursements depend on 
the results of these evaluations.104
Analysts and commentators have identified several potential problems 
related to outsourcing as practised in the public sector. Firstly, they have 
raised the general concern that the introduction of market-based reforms 
may undermine traditional forms of governmental legitimacy and account-
ability.105 Partnerships, however, are not naturally endowed with similar 
levels and types of accountability and legitimacy as governments. It is for 
this very reason that partnerships have been strongly criticised as a form of 
public private governance. It has been argued throughout this book that to 
counter these challenges, partnerships should adopt appropriate account-
ability mechanisms. For implementation partnerships, it was determined 
that because of their use and allocation of significant resources, a focus on 
accountability for outcomes was appropriate. In an answer to this general 
critique of outsourcing, implementation partnerships should therefore 
adopt the measures for enhancing outcome accountability discussed in this 
chapter.
Secondly, empirical studies have found that outsourcing does not neces-
sarily lead to enhanced competition. This can be due to several reasons. 
Public agencies may not use competitive bidding processes to allocate con-
tracts; where competitive bids are used, they may not attract a sufficient 
number of submissions to create competition; bids may not be evaluated in 
a fair manner but be used as a sham for allocating nepotistic contracts; and 
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contractors may not really fear sanctions such as losing their contracts as a 
result of bad performance.106
Thirdly, analyses of performance-based contracts used in outsourcing or 
in agreements with independent government agencies often criticise the 
way performance is evaluated. The contracts typically define the goals to be 
pursued by the contractor and specify which indicators will be used to assess 
performance. Since the chances of gaining future contracts and often the 
level of compensation for current activities depend on these performance 
evaluations, indicator targets have great importance for contractors. As dis-
cussed in the previous section of this chapter, there is a strong risk that the 
chosen performance indicators do not reflect all or even the most important 
aspects of the desired outcomes. Just as deciding on suitable performance 
indicators is key to establishing outcome accountability for partnership 
operations generally, it is also crucial for designing functioning performance-
based contracts with subcontractors.
Building on the experiences of the public sector, implementation partner-
ships should pay heed to the following principles when outsourcing parts 
of their tasks:
Use competitive and transparent bidding processes to allocate contracts. 
Outsourcing can only increase the efficiency of partnership operations 
and enhance accountability for outcomes if it introduces competition in 
the provision of goods and services. Only contract allocation practices in 
which potential providers submit offers competing on price as well as the 
type or quality of services offered are therefore suitable for implementa-
tion partnerships.
Ensure that a sufficient number of bids are submitted. To achieve this 
partnerships should only consider activity areas for outsourcing in which 
a number of different potential providers exist. Partnerships should also 
specify a minimum number of bids (for example, 3) required before any 
contract can be concluded.
Use a transparent and fair process for evaluating bids and allocating 
contracts. Where competitive bidding processes are opaque, staff may 
be influenced by factors not related to the bidding document, including 
instances of corruption. Partnerships should therefore ensure transpar-
ency in dealing with submissions and evaluate bids in an objective and 
fair manner.
Define adequate performance indicators to be included in the outsourcing 
contracts. Implementation partnerships should choose those activity areas 
for outsourcing where it is comparatively easy to define good performance 
indicators. Beyond that, partnerships should follow the standards for set-
ting performance indicators outlined in the previous section.
Link contractor performance to sanctions and incentives. Competitive 
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their performance. Where contracts are relatively long-term, partnerships 
should disburse resources in stages and make further payments dependent 
on performance. The prospect of new future contracts can also work as a 
powerful incentive. Work areas requiring ongoing or repeated efforts there-
fore lend themselves more easily to outsourcing than one-off contracts.
5.3.3.2 Collect beneficiary feedback to assess performance
Another critical contribution of markets to outcome accountability is that 
they provide consumers with an automatic and powerful avenue for express-
ing their opinions about products and services. Implementation partner-
ships, even if they do not operate under market conditions, can simulate this 
effect by gathering feedback from their clients or beneficiaries. This infor-
mation can be crucial for assessing the quality of the products and services 
delivered and for evaluating whether partnership activities meet the needs 
of their target groups.107
Among the case examples, some implementation partnerships are col-
lecting beneficiary and stakeholder feedback when evaluating their own or 
their contractors’ activities. Yet there is much scope for further expanding 
this practice. One positive example is RBM. When it conducted an intensive 
external evaluation of its activities in 2002, an important part of the process 
included interviews with stakeholders in affected countries.108 Similarly, the 
external evaluation conducted for the Stop TB partnership included sev-
eral interviews with stakeholders and beneficiaries in affected and targeted 
countries.109
Stakeholder interviews enable partnerships or external evaluators to gather 
focused in-depth information from a relatively broad range of participants. 
They are, however, comparatively expensive to conduct and are thus rarely 
used on an ongoing basis. A cheaper alternative with an even broader reach 
is using client or beneficiary satisfaction surveys. They are used by many 
companies as well as governments in countries where the introduction of 
results-based management techniques is advanced, such as Australia, the UK 
or the US.110 Both interviews and surveys, however, have a range of short-
comings. Thus they do not encourage debate or the exchange of information 
between different stakeholders, they are not suitable for providing ongoing 
feedback and they tend to strongly predetermine which topics are dealt 
with.111 Another option used by both governments and companies are focus 
groups. These smaller group discussions allow for a more intensive exchange 
and give stakeholders a stronger role in setting the agenda.112 Finally, many 
companies and governments have set up permanent complaints mecha-
nisms, such as complaints hotlines or complaints boxes. These encourage all 
clients or beneficiaries to voice their grievances but are often only used by 
strongly disaffected or engaged users.113
This brief discussion shows that each specific technique for gathering 
beneficiary feedback has its distinct advantages and problems. To provide 
154  Accountability in Public Policy Partnerships
useful input to an assessment of the partnership’s performance, feedback 
mechanisms should include information from diverse relevant sources and 
generate an accurate picture of beneficiary perceptions and opinions.114 To 
achieve this, implementation partnerships should adhere to the following 
principles when designing feedback mechanisms for beneficiaries:
Routinely gather information about beneficiary satisfaction and prefer-
ences. The implementation partnerships analysed as case examples here 
have mainly conducted stakeholder interviews as one-off or very irregular 
exercises. To engage in continuous quality improvement and to adapt 
their products and services to the needs of beneficiaries, however, part-
nerships should collect beneficiary feedback on a regular basis.
Combine several methods for collecting beneficiary feedback. When 
choosing a technique for gathering information from beneficiaries, part-
nerships usually face a trade-off between the reach of the chosen method, 
the depth and openness of the information it can generate and the dura-
tion and frequency with which it can be used. To optimise the supply of 
information, partnerships should therefore employ several methods at the 
same time.
Ensure coverage of relevant sources of information. Partnerships should 
make sure they receive feedback from the most relevant sources. Depending 
on the activities of the partnership, this may include, for example, poten-
tial beneficiaries who chose not to participate in a programme or it may 
require the collection of feedback over a longer period of time.
5.3.4 Summary of standards
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Ensure objectivity of data and their 
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Use competitive bidding processes to 
allocate contracts
Ensure submission of a sufficient 
number of bids
Use a transparent and fair process 
for evaluating bids and allocating 
contracts
Define adequate performance indicators 
for inclusion in the contracts
Link contractor performance to 
sanctions and incentives
Collect beneficiary 
feedback to assess 
performance
Routinely gather information about 
beneficiary satisfaction and preferences
Combine several methods for 
collecting beneficiary feedback
Ensure coverage of all relevant sources 
of information
5.4 Standards for information-generating partnerships
A final group of partnerships identified among the case examples is con-
cerned with the generation of information. Typically, partnerships work 
with two different kinds of information. One set of partnerships develops 
factual or technical information and knowledge about certain, often contro-
versial, issue areas. The WCD, for example, invested a major effort into the 
development of a ‘knowledge base’ to create a shared understanding among 
different stakeholder groups on the development effectiveness of dams.115
Another set of partnerships generates information with the aim of veri-
fying or certifying to what degree other organisations are complying with 
specific rules. The MSC, for instance, has created standards for sustainable 
fisheries. Companies complying with these rules can have their perform-
ance verified by independent certification organisations and apply the MSC 
label to their products.116 Similarly, the 4C initiative contains an element 
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of compliance verification. Rather than certifying full compliance with its 
standards, however, 4C engages organisations in a performance improve-
ment process. Thus the organisations themselves submit information relat-
ing to their compliance and draw up improvement plans for problematic 
areas. Implementation and the systems used for verification are subject to 
external audit or evaluation.117
As these examples show, partnerships rarely pursue the generation of 
information as their sole or even predominant goal. In the three cases just 
mentioned, information generation constitutes a major element of the part-
nerships’ work. Even they, however, do not see information generation as a 
goal in itself but rather as a means to achieve other objectives. Thus, for the 
WCD, it was an instrument to prepare the ground for consensual rules; MSC 
uses certification as a lever for increasing compliance with its standards and 
the 4C initiative supports its advocacy work by evaluating the implementa-
tion and verification of improvement plans.
Irrespective of what broader objectives the partnerships pursue, their 
information-generating activities are linked to specific accountability 
requirements. When partnerships create information or knowledge, they 
do so with the intention that other actors use and rely on that information. 
In other words, they want to achieve ex-post authorisation by their user 
groups to produce information on their behalf. Potential users are likely to 
do that if they feel they can trust the delivered information. To achieve this, 
partnerships must be able to demonstrate that they are independent and 
unbiased and that their work stands up to high professional standards.
As illustrated in Figure 5.4, where partnerships focus on the generation of 
information, they should emphasise accountability for independence and 
professionalism.
5.4.1 Transferable accountability practices in universities and the 
judiciary and guidance from relevant international standards
Like the other types of partnerships, information-generating partnerships do 
not have to build their accountability practices in a void. Rather, they can 
draw lessons from other, functionally similar organisations with more estab-
lished accountability traditions. As already mentioned, information genera-
tion can mean two different things to partnerships. They are usually either 
concerned with creating factual or technical information and knowledge or 
with assessing the compliance of other actors with certain standards or rules. 
These two kinds of information correspond to two different organisational 
functions. Information-generating partnerships can therefore draw on two 
types of institutions as role models for their accountability arrangements: 
universities and the judiciary. Moreover, they can orient themselves along 
international standards that have been developed for evaluation, compli-
ance verification and accreditation organisations.
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Universities form the classical institutional context for the creation of 
knowledge. Since the accountability arrangements of universities have not 
yet been discussed in this book, they warrant a slightly longer explanation 
at this stage. A crucial principle informing the governance characteristics of 
universities is the concept of academic freedom. Academic freedom describes 
the liberty of students, teachers and academic institutions to pursue their 
knowledge interests without undue interference. The unhampered search 
for truth is seen to confer benefits on society as a whole and the principle 
is closely linked to other precepts of liberal democratic thought. Today, aca-
demic freedom is broadly recognised as a normative ideal.118 The principle is 
most strongly protected in Germany, where it enjoys the status of a funda-
mental right and is enshrined in the constitution: ‘Kunst und Wissenschaft, 
Forschung und Lehre sind frei. Die Freiheit der Lehre entbindet nicht von der 
Treue zur Verfassung’ (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007, Art. 5, § 3).119
In the US, to cite another national example, academic freedom is not 
directly referred to in the constitution. The Supreme Court has, however, 
consistently interpreted academic freedom as part of the first amendment 
right to free speech.120 Moreover, most US-American academic institutions 
have endorsed the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure (American Association of University Professors and Association of 
American Colleges, 1940). By subscribing to this document, colleges and 
universities commit to protecting the freedom of their staff in teaching and 
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research. Similarly, the academic freedom of university teachers is enshrined 
in the UK’s 1988 Education Reform Act.121
To guarantee academic freedom, academic institutions and their staff 
need to enjoy a certain degree of independence. Two main mechanisms 
serve to ensure this independence. Firstly, universities are usually conceived 
as autonomous organisations. This means that even where universities are 
public institutions, they handle all issues relating to teaching and research 
internally.122 Secondly, the independence of individual university teachers is 
secured through the institution of tenure. Tenure provides university teach-
ers with a strong, though not unconditional, guarantee of employment. It 
ensures that they cannot be fired or financially penalised for pursuing a 
specific line of inquiry in research or teaching.123
The accountability arrangements of institutions of higher learning are, 
however, not only determined by the principle of academic freedom. Another 
strong concern for universities and their funders is to ensure a high quality 
of research and teaching. Ongoing mechanisms of quality control can easily 
undermine the independence of university teachers. Classically, universi-
ties have therefore defined very strict professional criteria for applicants to 
academic posts. These standards introduce formal criteria for academic staff 
and create strong peer control. To achieve a tenured position, scholars need 
to pass a range of formal exams, such as Bachelors’, Masters’ and get doctoral 
degrees. In addition, professors in the Anglo-American world can only receive 
tenure after a lengthy period of probation.124 Germany and Austria, by con-
trast, still largely rely on the more formalistic quality assessment provided 
by an additional postdoctoral qualification, the habilitation. Academic peers 
play an important role in determining the qualification of their colleagues. 
Only the academic staff of recognised institutions of higher learning can 
decide whether individuals pass the formal tests and have the authority to 
award academic titles. Moreover, committees composed of fellow professors 
and other staff usually have a strong say in the selection of candidates for 
academic positions.
Through formal tests and strict appointment procedures, universities 
guarantee that their teachers and researchers are highly qualified. While 
these mechanisms are well suited for ensuring high professional standards 
when appointing new academic staff, they are less apt at vouching for good 
ongoing quality. Especially tenured professors, who enjoy job and income 
security, only face soft incentives for maintaining high standards. Many 
see the lure of prestige and a good reputation as an insufficient means of 
quality control. Over recent years, an increasing number of countries and 
universities have therefore increased their efforts at creating mechanisms for 
ongoing quality assurance. As consequence, promotion, tender and budget 
allocation decisions do now often take into account the results of perform-
ance assessments, based, for example, on student assessments or publication 
indices. In addition, university rankings focusing on the quality of teaching 
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and research create more transparency and competition among institutions 
of higher learning.125
Ongoing mechanisms of quality control have become a popular element 
of academic accountability. Despite their popularity, however, they are fre-
quently criticised for undermining academic freedom.126 There is thus often 
a tension between the two pillars of accountability in academia, independ-
ence and high quality or professionalism.
If independence and professionalism are the two main principles underly-
ing academic accountability, how does this compare to the other possible role 
model for information-generating partnerships, the judiciary? One author 
has likened the role of tenured professors to that of judges: ‘In relation to ten-
ure the position of the faculty member resembles that of the judge who holds 
office during good behavior to safeguard his fearlessness and objectivity in 
the performance of his duties’ (Fuchs, 1963, p. 431). Indeed, typical judicial 
accountability arrangements show important similarities to these principles 
of academic accountability. In the liberal democratic tradition the judiciary 
is subject to few external controls. To ensure accountability, the judiciary 
instead relies mainly on independence and self-control.
Judicial independence entails firstly the formal autonomy of courts and 
judges. Accordingly, other state organs or external actors have no authority 
to change and reverse judgements or to interfere with judicial processes. 
Secondly, special measures serve to undergird the de facto independence of 
individual judges. Thus, for example, they usually enjoy long or life tenures 
as well as guaranteed salaries.
Again, independence is not the only relevant element of judicial account-
ability. To avoid the abuse of authority and ensure professionalism in the 
work of the judiciary, several mechanisms of self-control are typically in 
operation. The appeals process provides a bulwark against arbitrary individ-
ual decisions and promotes the consistent interpretation and application of 
legal principles. Compliance verification partnerships also pass judgement 
over whether or not individuals or organisations comply with specific sets of 
rules. Unlike the judiciary, however, partnerships mostly deal with voluntary 
norms and only have access to soft enforcement mechanisms. The institution 
of a full appeals process is therefore not required of information-generating 
partnerships.
Other measures adopted in the judiciary focus on the qualification and 
professionalism of legal staff. Thus most countries have defined very strict 
professional standards. They typically involve a formal education as well as 
official entry exams. In most cases, only the best-qualified individuals are 
eligible for the office of judge.
Both universities and the judiciary, then, stress independence and profes-
sionalism or quality control in their accountability arrangements. These 
principles are also reflected in international standards for inspection, certi-
fication and accreditation bodies. Relevant standards include, for example, 
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the ISO guide 65 defining general requirements for bodies operating product 
certification systems (International Organization for Standardization, 1996), 
ISO standard 17011 for accreditation bodies (International Organization 
for Standardization, 2004) and ISO standard 19011 for quality and envi-
ronmental management systems auditing (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2002). These standards vary in their focus and in some of 
the details of their recommendations. Overall, however, they all define crite-
ria to safeguard the impartiality and independence, as well as the quality and 
professionalism of organisations and their staff.
5.4.2 Accountability for impartiality through independence
Other actors will only rely on the information generated by partnerships if 
they trust it. The results of studies or enquiries quickly lose their trustworthi-
ness if suspected to be biased or influenced by specific interests. To create 
accountability for generating trustworthy information, partnerships must 
ensure their impartiality and independence.
The partnerships analysed as case examples above have chosen different 
strategies to guarantee that their information-generating activities are impar-
tial. The WCD was itself ultimately responsible for compiling the report on 
the development effectiveness of dams. The commission was independent in 
so far as its findings were not subject to the control of any external party. The 
commission also enjoyed relative financial independence because it received 
support from a wide range of donors from all sectors and did not grant these 
donors any special role in its governance structure. Moreover, the commis-
sioners were chosen to represent a balance among different stakeholder 
groups, they all enjoyed good international standing and reputation, were 
appointed for the entire duration of the process and were not financially 
dependent on their work as commissioners.
The 4C initiative, by contrast, has commissioned independent external 
organisations with the task of auditing and verifying the compliance of 
its members. Local verifiers have to be accredited by the Common Code 
Association. They are independent but can be subject to a systems verifica-
tion, in turn conducted by an independent external organisation. Moreover, 
the 4C initiative demands that local verifiers disclose conflicts of interest. 
Similarly, MSC delegates compliance verification and certification to inde-
pendent, accredited evaluators. The partnership goes a step further than the 
4C initiative in that it even entrusts the accreditation process to an independ-
ent body. Explicitly following ISO standards 17011 and 19011, the agency 
(Accreditation Services International) accredits certification agencies, which 
in turn conduct certification assessments.
Which specific standards, then, should both kinds of information-generat-
ing partnerships fulfil relating to their impartiality and independence? The 
experiences of the judiciary and academia as well as the standards defined 
by ISO suggest that two complementary steps are necessary: Safeguarding the 
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institutional independence of the bodies in charge of generating information 
and ensuring the personal independence of their staff members.
5.4.2.1 Ensure institutional independence
A first step to guarantee the impartiality of the knowledge or assessments 
developed by partnerships is to grant the bodies responsible for generating 
information institutional independence. Institutional independence has 
various dimensions.
Firstly, and most importantly, information-generating bodies should enjoy 
formal authority over their findings and results. Neither academia, nor the 
judiciary, for example, enjoys total autonomy. Thus universities are usu-
ally either public bodies or they need to be officially accredited. In many 
countries, moreover, the government formally appoints key academic staff. 
Similarly, judicial institutions are typically part of the government appara-
tus, rather than fully independent of it. Courts are public institutions and 
their judges are most often civil servants that are formally appointed by the 
government. Yet, both kinds of institutions are formally autonomous in the 
sense that no other institution has the right to interfere with their substantial 
results or decisions.
Thus academic freedom entails that universities can choose their focus 
in teaching and research and that research results are not subject to censor-
ship.127 Analogously, the verdicts of courts are considered binding and final 
and can only be reversed or changed through other judicial decisions.128 
According to ISO, the same standard should apply to certification bodies. It 
demands that the certification body be responsible for all decisions relating 
to the granting, maintaining, extending, suspending and withdrawing of 
certifications.129
Secondly, the financial position of the information-generating body can 
play an important role. Financial dependence on interested parties can under-
mine de facto institutional independence. The judiciary and academia, for 
example, typically receive the overwhelming majority of their resources from 
the public purse. But at the same time, the principles of judicial independence 
and academic freedom are grounded in public law. Public financial support 
can therefore not be tied to conditions relating to the substance of the work of 
these institutions.130 Referring to the same question, the ISO standards stress 
that the bodies responsible for certification or accreditation should be free 
from undue commercial, financial or other pressures. They also emphasise 
that these bodies should describe their sources of income and avoid conflicts 
of interest.131
Finally, especially where complete independence from external interests 
cannot be guaranteed, institutional impartiality may entail the involvement 
of a balanced group of stakeholder representatives. In court, for example, 
judges are expected to be neutral and independent. At the same time, how-
ever, both the plaintiff and the defendant are represented through their 
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legal counsels. Similarly, the ISO standards and guidelines request at several 
occasions that processes should be open to the participation of interested 
stakeholder groups.132 Balanced multi-stakeholder arrangements may be 
particularly relevant for partnerships, which by definition are made up of 
different interest groups.
Following these examples, information-generating partnerships should 
adhere to a set of principles to ensure their impartiality and independence:
Grant information-generating bodies formal and final authority over find-
ings and results. To ensure that no external interests can manipulate the 
findings of the bodies in charge of generating information, they should 
have the last word on the subject. Correspondingly, no other institution 
should have the authority to correct, change, or otherwise amend their 
results.
Seek unconditional, diverse and transparent institutional funding. The 
institutional entities responsible for generating information should enjoy 
as much financial security as possible. To avoid vulnerability to external 
pressure, information-generating partnerships should try to receive finan-
cial support that is not tied to any substantive results. Preferably, they 
should rely on diverse funding sources and they should always create 
maximum transparency concerning their sources of funds.
Where complete independence from external interests is not possible, 
seek a balanced multi-stakeholder representation. As an alternative to 
full independence from external parties, partnerships can foster their 
impartiality by including a balanced number of representatives of diverse 
interests in their information-generating committees.
5.4.2.2 Foster personal independence
Institutional independence is only one side of the coin. To create a further 
bulwark against the manipulation of their findings, key staff members must 
be protected against external pressures and enjoy personal independence. 
Several factors can help to strengthen the independent position of key staff 
members.
Firstly, both academia and the judiciary rely on a high degree of job and 
income security for professors and judges to increase their immunity against 
external pressure. In the US, for example, life tenure and guaranteed salaries 
for judges are even enshrined in the constitution:
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their 
Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their 
Services a Compensation which shall not be diminished during their 
Continuance in Office.
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Similarly, the academic world has a tradition of granting life tenure to 
 professors.134 The practice here, however, is not handled as strictly as in the 
judiciary. Following the criticism that tenure can have a negative impact on 
performance, an increasing number of teachers and researchers work off the 
tenure track. In addition, tenured professors can often be dismissed on the 
basis of a faculty decision.
Other organisations may find it difficult to create as much job and income 
security as the judiciary or academia. They may, for instance, not have the 
necessary financial security and planning horizon to offer lifetime appoint-
ments. In addition, the tasks they pursue may be of shorter duration. ISO 
has therefore proposed a more general formulation for the employees of 
accreditation bodies that can be transferred more easily to public policy 
partnerships:
All accreditation body personnel and committees that could influence 
the accreditation process shall act objectively and shall be free from any 
undue commercial, financial and other pressures that could compromise 
impartiality.
(International Organization for Standardization, 
2004, clause 4.3.4.)
A second common step for ensuring the objectivity and independence 
of individual findings or assessments is to exclude conflicts of interest. 
Psychological research has found that financial interests create a self-serving 
bias in the perceptions and assessments of individuals. Interestingly, most 
test persons were unable to avoid this bias even when it would have been in 
their best interest to do so.135 Institutions valuing objectivity therefore usu-
ally adopt practical measures to prevent or deal with conflicts of interest.
In the judiciary, impartiality is a core value. It is symbolised, for example, 
by Iustitia, the Roman Goddess of Justice, who in many depictions wears a 
blindfold to indicate that she assesses the merits of each case objectively. 
To ensure the impartiality of individual judges in practice, two measures 
are common in the judiciary. Firstly, the principle of impartiality and its 
practical implications are usually contained in the codes of ethics adopted 
by courts or professional associations.136 Secondly, procedural rules of justice 
often contain elements protecting the impartiality of judgements. Thus, for 
example, some legal systems allow for the exclusion of judges from trials 
when they are reasonably suspected to be biased and others allow for appeals 
when bias can be demonstrated.137
In academia, an important control mechanism for ensuring the impartial-
ity of research findings works on an informal level. Peer control, the public 
debate of research results and reputation effects create accountability for 
impartiality. In addition, however, universities, professional organisations 
and in some cases public authorities have also found more formal ways to 
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deal with potential conflicts of interest. Thus the codes of ethics adopted 
by many professional associations and universities often contain principles 
relating to conflicts of interest.138 In some countries, in addition, many pro-
fessors enjoy the rank of civil servants. In that case, they are subject to more 
general regulations for civil servants, which often include the requirements 
to disclose financial interests or to obtain permission for engaging in addi-
tional occupations.139
The ISO standards and guidelines, finally, also make frequent reference to 
and propose concrete rules for dealing with conflicts of interest. Thus, for 
example, ISO guide 65 requests that certification bodies be free from external 
pressures and that they do not supply or design products of the type they 
certify, that they do not provide applicants with advice or consulting services 
related to the certification process and that they provide no other products or 
services which could compromise the confidentiality, objectivity and impar-
tiality of their decisions (International Organization for Standardization, 
1996, clauses 4.2.n and 4.2.o). Similarly, ISO standard 17011 prescribes that 
accreditation bodies shall not offer any service that may affect their imparti-
ality and that they shall identify potential conflicts of interest that can arise 
from their or from related bodies’ activities (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2004, clauses 4.3.6 and 4.3.7).
Thirdly, independence is not only a matter of objective circumstances 
but also of personal character. John Ferejohn, for example, explicitly intro-
duces this aspect in his discussion of judicial independence: ‘Independence, 
or impartiality, in this sense is a desirable aspect of a judge’s character’ 
(Ferejohn, 1999b, p. 353).
It is difficult to establish formal criteria and procedures for assessing an 
individual’s character. In academia and the judiciary, however, the selec-
tion or election and appointment processes leave ample space for character 
considerations. ISO has attempted to define the desirable personal attributes 
of individuals conducting quality or environmental management systems 
audits. Accordingly, an auditor should be ethical, open-minded, diplo-
matic, observant, perceptive, versatile, tenacious, decisive and self-reliant 
(International Organization for Standardization, 2002, clause 7.2).
In designing their accountability arrangements focusing on the personal 
independence of key staff members, information-generating partnerships 
should orient themselves along these examples and observe the following 
principles:
Ensure that staff members are free from undue commercial or finan-
cial pressures. To achieve this, institutions concerned with generating 
information can adopt two different strategies. One option is to work 
with financially independent experts that are not reliant on any income 
 generated through their participation in the partnership. As an alternative, 
•
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partnerships can offer reasonable job and income security for information-
generating staff. This can involve, for example, fixed-term contracts as well 
as lump sum payments that are agreed upon at the outset and cannot be 
reduced based on the content of the results delivered.
Adopt a written conflict of interest policy and require the disclosure of 
financial interests. Information-generating bodies should adopt explicit 
conflict of interest policies, outlining which external activities of key 
staff members are acceptable and which are not. Moreover, they should 
require all key personnel to indicate which other interests they hold.
Appoint individuals of strong, independent character. To enhance the 
probability that individual researchers and evaluators are personally 
little susceptible to external pressure, information-generating partner-
ships can include a list of desired personal attributes in their job descrip-
tions. Moreover, the selection and appointment process should enable a 
relatively large group of individuals to assess said personal characteristics 
alongside professional qualifications.
5.4.3 Accountability for accuracy and quality through 
professionalism
For information to be reliable and trustworthy, it does not only need to be 
unbiased. In addition, it needs to be accurate and of high quality. Next to 
safeguarding the independence of their information-generating bodies and 
staff, partnerships should therefore also ensure that they are professional 
and adhere to high quality standards.
The information-generating partnerships among the case examples rely 
on several strategies for ensuring the accuracy and quality of their results. 
For the creation of its knowledge base, the WCD, for example, selected com-
missioners of high repute representing different stakeholder interests. The 
commission then collected various kinds of inputs, including case studies 
of important dam projects, public submissions and debates with involved 
groups. Moreover, the commission relied on the WCD Forum to test the 
conclusions it drew from this evidence.
The 4C initiative also employs several parallel mechanisms to ensure 
the accuracy and quality of its assessment and verification schemes. 
Independent local verifiers verify the self-assessments submitted by local 
4C units. These verifiers must fulfil specific conditions, be listed by the 4C 
Secretariat and receive special 4C training.140 In addition, local verifications 
can be subject to a systems verification. These verifications are conducted 
by ‘internationally recognised bodies’ appointed by the executive board of 
the 4C association. The initiative also has several channels for dealing with 
disputes arising in the context of verification. Potential complaints are dealt 
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In a similar vein, MSC has various mechanisms in place to ensure the 
accuracy and quality of its certification processes. All certification bodies 
have to be accredited by an independent accrediting agency contracted 
by MSC. Moreover, MSC has defined standards relating to the professional 
expertise each assessment team must include.141 In parallel to these stand-
ards, stakeholders and interested parties are given several opportunities to 
comment on the certification process.142 If they are not satisfied with the 
final assessment, they can also lodge a formal objection. The certification 
body itself hears objections, but appeals to the MSC Objections Panel are 
also possible.
The practice of these information-generation partnerships, the experi-
ences of the judiciary and academia and the standards defined by ISO sug-
gest that partnerships should take two main steps to ensure that their results 
are accurate and of good quality: they should entrust the task of generating 
information to experts with relevant professional qualifications and they 
should create avenues for verifying results.
5.4.3.1 Recruit experts with formal qualification and good reputation
A crucial measure for fostering trust in a partnership’s findings is to ensure 
that the individuals entrusted with generating information have appropriate 
professional qualifications and enjoy a good reputation.
Academia and the judiciary rely on similar practical steps to guarantee 
the professionalism of their staff. Both use specialised higher education 
programmes and professional training combined with official admissions 
tests as formal selection criteria. Thus only individuals that have successfully 
completed the relevant university education and that have passed the respec-
tive bar or state exams are eligible as candidates. In many cases, the ensuing 
selection and appointment process introduces an additional element of peer 
or popular evaluation. In academia, for example, the faculty usually plays a 
strong role in assessing and ranking potential new colleagues. In the judiciary, 
only some countries include peer or popular assessments in their selection 
procedures. In the US, for example, many judges are appointed following 
popular elections. Other judges are selected based on merit. In this case, a 
nomination committee comprising fellow lawyers as well as non-lawyers 
 usually nominates them.143
The judiciary and different academic subjects each have their own 
dedicated higher education programmes as well as specialised qualification 
exams. Other institutions concerned with producing knowledge or assessing 
behaviour may be younger and may concentrate on much smaller thematic 
niches. For many, it is therefore difficult to resort to equally formalised and 
standardised selection practices. Instead, however, they can provide clear 
definitions of the formal qualifications and practical experiences they require 
of candidates. And they can offer additional specialised training to their staff. 
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ISO, for example, has defined such standards for quality and environmental 
management systems auditors.144 In addition, ISO requires that auditors dem-
onstrate their continual professional development and that they undergo 
regular evaluation.
To achieve similar levels of professionalism to the institutions discussed 
above, the partnership or independent bodies entrusted with generating 
information should comply with the following standards:
Define necessary professional qualifications in terms of skills, education, 
work experience and training. For the recruitment of their research-
ers, evaluators or certifiers, information-generating partnerships should 
clearly outline formal qualification requirements. These should include 
a description of necessary generic skills as well as concrete conditions 
concerning the applicant’s formal education, training and years and type 
of work experience.
Include elements of peer or stakeholder assessment in the selection proc-
ess of staff members. In addition to meeting formal criteria, it is important 
that candidates demonstrate the quality of their work. A proven practical 
way of achieving this is to involve peers or a broader group of stakeholder 
representatives in the nomination and selection of applicants.
Where tasks are very specific, provide staff members with targeted training. 
Especially in partnerships engaged in compliance verification and certifica-
tion, it is important that evaluators interpret and apply criteria consistently 
and follow comparable assessment strategies. To ensure staff members are 
able to do that, specialised training may be necessary.
Encourage continuous professional development and periodically evaluate 
staff competences. Finally, information-generating partnerships should 
also be concerned with further developing the competences and experi-
ences of their staff. They should therefore invest in the creation of pro-
fessional development strategies. Regular evaluations of staff skills can, 
moreover, help to identify competence gaps and training needs.
5.4.3.2 Create possibilities for verifying or disputing results
Even the best-qualified and independent researchers and assessors can err 
in their analyses and judgements. A final important step for increasing the 
trustworthiness of the generated information therefore involves creating 
avenues for debating, disputing or verifying results.
In the academic world, open debate is a fundamental principle contrib-
uting to the advancement of science. The academic community is so big 
and structured in such a way that there are usually one or several groups 
of researchers focusing on the same or very similar topics. In this environ-
ment, new findings are subject to intense scrutiny and debate. And, with-
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results enter the canon of established knowledge. With the emergence of 
new approaches or contrary research results, however, even ‘established 
knowledge’ can be challenged at any time. Academia also acknowledges the 
importance of peer opinions in a more structured way. Thus, for example, 
the most respected scientific journals tend to be those involving a peer-
review process. The reputation and influence of individual researchers, in 
turn, depends in part on how many articles they manage to publish in 
recognised journals.
A much more formal approach to debating or verifying results is dominant 
in the judiciary. Most judicial systems include a hierarchy of courts. Parties 
who feel wronged by a judgement can appeal to and have their case reheard 
by a court at a higher level.145 Only the decisions of the highest court can-
not be challenged within the judicial system. Appeals processes have been 
recognised as very effective means of recognising and rectifying judicial 
mistakes.146
For organisations involved in certification and accreditation activities at 
the international level, ISO has defined relevant standards. Accordingly, 
these organisations should have a – preferably independent – person or 
body to deal with complaints, appeals or disputes. The processes should 
include a decision on the validity of the appeal, the taking of appropriate 
action and a public documentation of all appeals, decisions and correspond-
ing actions.147
For information-generating partnerships, these practices and rules can be 
translated into the following standards:
Develop a procedure for soliciting public comments on drafts. Information 
generating partnerships should make copies of their preliminary findings 
available to the public. They should also adopt a formal procedure for 
dealing with comments received.
Encourage and facilitate open debate about findings and results. 
Especially partnerships engaged in the creation of knowledge should 
actively promote debate on their findings. Depending on the context of 
the initiative, this may require holding local or regional discussion fora 
or establishing electronic debate platforms. Formal peer-review processes 
can further enhance the credibility of their results.
Create a formal complaints or appeals processes. Partnerships engaged in 
verifying or certifying compliance with certain standards should, moreo-
ver, have formal and institutionalised complaints and appeals processes. 
This involves having a designated, preferably independent, person or 
body for hearing complaints and a clear process for deciding and taking 
action on appeals. In addition, the process should be made transparent 
by maintaining and publishing records of all complaints and appeals, as 




5.4.4 Summary of standards
Table 5.4 provides an overview of relevant accountability standards for 
information-generating partnerships.











Grant information-generating bodies 
formal and final authority over their 
findings and results
Seek unconditional, diverse and 
transparent financial support
Where complete independence from 
external interests is not possible, seek 
balanced stakeholder representation
Foster personal 
independence of key 
staff
Ensure that staff members are free 
from undue commercial and financial 
pressures
Adopt a conflict of interest policy 
and require the disclosure of financial 
interests
Appoint individuals of strong, 
independent character
Accountability 







Define necessary professional 
qualifications in terms of skills, 
education, work experience and 
training
Include elements of peer or stakeholder 
assessment in the selection process for 
staff members
Where tasks are very specific, provide 
staff members with targeted training
Encourage continuous professional 






Develop a procedure for soliciting 
public comments on drafts 
Encourage and facilitate open debate 
about findings and results (especially 
for partnerships generating knowledge)
Create a formal complaints or appeals 
process (especially for partnerships 
verifying compliance)
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